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ABSTRACT   
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the database system 
used at the South African Radiation Control Authority and compare it with RAIS 
(Regulatory Authority Information System). A radiation regulatory authority requires an 
adequate and effective data management system in order to carry out its regulatory 
control program efficiently and effectively. RAIS is a comprehensive system that 
includes all of the main functionality required to support a regulatory framework.  
 
A mixed methods approach, including a quantitative descriptive comparative evaluation 
research study was conducted to determine if the database system currently used by 
the South African Radiation Control Authority is effective as a data management tool for 
a regulatory body. Two analyses were conducted. Firstly, the specification records of 
the South African database system were compared with that of RAIS. Secondly, current 
database users were surveyed by means of a structured questionnaire.  
 
Both analyses reveal that RAIS performs better than the Radiation Control database in 
the main areas of the regulatory framework. The study results also highlight some of the 
shortcomings and strengths of the Radiation Control database.    
 
KEY CONCEPTS 
Database; RAIS; Radiation sources; Radiation protection; Radiation regulatory 
framework; Radiation safety; Authorisation; Inspection; Enforcement; ERD.   
I 
 
Table of contents 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ……......…………………….………………………........ 1 
 
1.2  BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  .................................................. 1 
 
1.2.1 Radiation Control in South Africa ........................................................... 1  
1.2.2 Current status of data management in Radiation Control ...................... 4 
1.2.3  The international Regulatory Authority Information System ................... 4  
1.2.3.1 Current status of Radiation Control‟s data management ....................... 5  
 
1.3   RESEARCH PROBLEM ........................................................................ 6 
  
1.4   AIM OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 6 
 
1.4.1  Research purpose .................................................................................. 6 
1.4.2 Research objectives ............................................................................... 7 
 
1.5  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .......................................................... 7 
  
1.6  DEFINITIONS OF TERMS .................................................................... 8 
1.6.1 Authorisation .......................................................................................... 8 
1.6.2  Database system ................................................................................... 8 
1.6.3  Management and radiation sources ...................................................... 8 
1.6.4  RAIS – Regulatory Authority Information System .................................. 9 
II 
 
 
 
1.6.5  The regulatory authority/body‟s regulatory control ................................. 9 
 
1.7  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD ................................................... 9  
1.7.1 Population ............................................................................................ 10 
1.7.2  Sample and sampling ........................................................................... 10 
1.7.3  Data collection ...................................................................................... 10 
1.7.4  Data analysis ........................................................................................ 11 
1.7.5  Validity and reliability ............................................................................ 11 
1.7.6  Ethical considerations .......................................................................... 11 
 
1.8   SCOPE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................... 12 
  
1.9  STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION ............................................. 12 
 
1.10  CONCLUSION  .................................................................................... 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
III 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION ...…………………………….……..………...………........  14 
 
2.2  DATABASE CONCEPTS ......................................................................... 14 
2.2.1   The database and the database management system (DBMS) ..............  14 
2.2.2   Database features .................................................................................... 16 
2.2.3   The Radiation Control database system .................................................. 18 
2.2.4   Radiation Control database features ........................................................ 19 
 
2.3  RAIS ......................................................................................................... 21 
2.3.1  Features and advantages of RAIS ........................................................... 22 
2.3.2  Other countries‟ implementation and use of RAIS ................................... 23 
2.3.3    Database schemas ................................................................................... 26 
2.3.3.1   Radiation Control database ...................................................................... 27 
2.3.3.2   RAIS ......................................................................................................... 30 
 
2.4  FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A DATABASE APPLICATION.... 33  
2.4.1  Interface requirements .............................................................................. 34  
2.4.2  Business requirements ............................................................................. 35  
2.4.3  Regulatory/Compliance requirements ...................................................... 35  
2.4.4  Security requirements ............................................................................... 36  
2.4.5  Overview of application requirements ...................................................... 36  
2.4.5.1  Client/Server architecture ......................................................................... 37  
2.4.5.2  Multitier architecture ................................................................................. 37  
2.4.6  Functional model ...................................................................................... 38  
2.4.6.1  Radiation Control database functional model ........................................... 38  
2.4.6.2  RAIS functional model .............................................................................. 41 
2.4.7  An ideal Radiation Control database system ........................................... 42      
 
IV 
 
 
 
2.5  RADIATION SOURCES .......................................................................... 43 
2.5.1   Categorisation of radioactive sources ..................................................... 43 
2.5.2   Role of a regulatory programme ............................................................. 45 
2.5.2.1   Regulatory infrastructure ......................................................................... 45 
2.5.2.2   Radiological protection in occupational exposure ................................... 49 
2.5.2.3   Radiological protection in medical exposure ........................................... 50 
2.5.2.4   Public and environmental radiological protection .................................... 50 
2.5.2.5    Emergency preparedness and response ............................................... 51 
2.5.3   National register of radiation sources ..................................................... 52 
2.5.3.1   Sources in transition ............................................................................... 55 
2.5.3.2   Disused/spent sources ........................................................................... 55 
2.5.3.3   Orphan sources ...................................................................................... 56 
 
2.6   REGULATORY FRAMEWORK .............................................................. 56 
2.6.1   National regulatory infrastructure ............................................................ 57 
2.6.2   Facilities and departments ...................................................................... 58 
2.6.3   Workers and radiation events ................................................................. 59 
2.6.4   Technical services ................................................................................... 60 
2.5.4.1   Dosimetry services .................................................................................. 60 
2.6.4.2    Analytical services ................................................................................... 61 
2.6.4.3   Calibration services ................................................................................. 61 
2.6.4.4   Waste management services .................................................................. 62 
2.6.4.5   Training services ..................................................................................... 62 
    
2.7   SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 62 
 
2.8      CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 63 
   
 
 
 
V 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD  
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION …………………………………...……………………….... 64 
 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................... 64 
3.2.1  Non-experimental ...................................................................................... 65 
3.2.2  Descriptive ................................................................................................ 65 
3.2.3 Comparative .............................................................................................. 66 
 
3.3  RESEARCH METHOD ............................................................................. 67 
 
3.3.1  Population ................................................................................................. 67 
3.3.1.1 Sampling ................................................................................................... 67 
3.3.1.2 Sample ...................................................................................................... 68 
3.3.2 Data collection ........................................................................................... 68 
3.3.2.1 Data collection instruments ....................................................................... 69 
3.3.2.2 Characteristics of data collection instruments  .......................................... 70 
3.3.2.3 Ethical considerations related to data collection ....................................... 71 
3.3.3  Data analysis ............................................................................................ 73 
 
3.4  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE STUDY ....................... 73 
 
3.5  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4  
 
ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………... 75 
 
4.2  DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS .................................................. 78 
 
4.3  RESEARCH RESULTS ............................................................................ 78 
4.3.1  Sample characteristics ............................................................................. 78 
4.3.1.1 Respondents‟ position at Radiation Control ............................................. 80 
4.3.1.2 Use of database per week ....................................................................... 81 
4.3.1.3 Remote access importance ..................................................................... 82 
4.3.1.4 Missing data ............................................................................................. 82 
4.3.1.5 Inconsistent/ambiguous data ................................................................... 83 
4.3.1.6 Features that could be added to the database ......................................... 83 
4.3.1.7 Should the database be customisable? ................................................... 83 
 
4.3.2  Database resources ................................................................................. 84 
4.3.2.1 Database human resources ..................................................................... 84 
4.3.2.2 Database link with other relevant information resources ......................... 85 
4.3.2.3 Consolidated data .................................................................................... 86 
4.3.2.4 Regulatory authority‟s organisational structure ........................................ 87 
4.3.2.5 Memorandum of understanding information on the database ................. 89 
4.3.2.6 Facilities and departments information for source tracking ..................... 89 
4.3.2.7 Radiation sources details to facilitate tracking ......................................... 90 
4.3.2.8 Authorisation, inspection, and enforcement processes ........................... 90 
4.3.2.9 Online submissions and monitoring of applications ................................. 91 
4.3.2.10 Graded enforcement action process ........................................................ 92 
 
4.3.3  Database scope ....................................................................................... 93 
VII 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Regulatory processes and the database integration ................................ 93 
4.3.3.2 Importance of data consistency checking ................................................ 93 
4.3.3.3 Protection of vital data ............................................................................. 94 
4.3.3.4 Database access control ......................................................................... 95 
4.3.3.5 Database as means for information dissemination .................................. 96 
4.3.3.6 Interface for catalogues ........................................................................... 97 
4.3.3.7 Online submission of data by facilities ..................................................... 98 
 
4.3.4 General database information views ....................................................... 99 
4.3.4.1 Uncaptured relevant data ........................................................................ 99 
4.3.4.2 Limited database access for inspectors ................................................. 100 
4.3.4.3 Specific database access for licensees ................................................. 100 
4.3.4.4 Division of Radiation Control database .................................................. 101 
4.3.4.5 Other information resources database access ...................................... 101 
4.3.4.6 Access to other needed information resources ..................................... 102 
4.3.4.7 Source categorisation information ......................................................... 102 
4.3.4.8 Database essential technical services information ................................ 103 
 
4.4  OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS ...................................... 104 
 
4.5  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION .……………………………………………………………....... 108 
 
5.2  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD .......................................................... 108 
 
5.3  SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF  
 THE RESEARCH FINDINGS ........................................................................ 109 
 
5.3.1  Objective 1 .................................................................................................... 111 
5.3.2  Objective 2 .................................................................................................... 111 
 
5.4  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................ 113 
 
5.5  RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 114 
 
5.6  CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY ............................................................. 116 
 
5.7  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .................................................................... 117 
 
5.8  CONCLUDING REMARKS .............................................................................. 117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ALARA   As Low As Reasonably Achievable  
A/RPO  Acting Radiation Protection Officer 
BSS    International Basic Safety Standards  
CPU    Central Processing Unit  
DA    Democratic Alliance  
DAIR    Department of Authorization, Inspection and Regulation  
DAV    Data Authoring and Versioning  
DBA    Database Administrator  
DBMS   Data Base Management System  
ERD    Entity Relationship Diagram  
ERM    Entity Relationship Model  
FAO    Food and Agriculture Organization   
IAEA    International Atomic Energy Agency  
IBM DB2  International Business Machines (Corporation) Database 2  
IEC    International Electrotechnical Commission  
ILO    International Labour Organization  
INES    International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
ISO    International Organization for Standardization   
ICSRS  International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources  
JDBC   Java Database Connectivity  
LAEC    Lebanese Atomic Energy Commission 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
MSA    Microsoft Access  
NEA    Nuclear Energy Agency  
NECSA  National Energy Corporation of South Africa 
NNRA   Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority  
NROD   National Register of Occupational Doses  
ODBC   Open Database Connectivity  
ODP    Oracle Data Provider  
X 
 
 
 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development   
OLE    Object Linking and Embeding   
PAHO   Pan American Health Organization   
PDA    Personal Digital Assistant  
PL    Procedural Language  
PPE    Personal Protective Equipment  
QA    Quality Assurance  
RAC    Real Application Clusters  
RAIS    Regulatory Authority Information Sources  
RDBMS   Relational Database Management System 
RP   Responsible Person 
RPO   Radiation Protection Officer 
RPI    Radiation Protection Institute  
RSA    Republic of South Africa  
RSS    Radioactive Sealed Sources  
SAEC   Sudanese Atomic Energy Commission  
SRS    Sealed Radiation Source Registry System  
SQL    Structured Query Language  
TSAs    Thematic Safety Areas  
WHO    World Health Organization  
XML    Extensible Markup Language  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XI 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1  Source categorization and security group ............................................... 44 
 
Table 2.2  Exemption ............................................................................................... 48 
 
Table 2.3  National register of radiation sources ...................................................... 54  
 
Table 2.4  Occupational dose limits ......................................................................... 60  
 
Table 4.1  Checklist results ...................................................................................... 76   
  
Table 4.2  Human resources devoted to database matters ..................................... 84   
 
Table 4.3 Why the database should be linked to other relevant resources ............ 86   
 
Table 4.4  Database uncaptured relevant data ....................................................... 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XII 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
  
Figure 1.1  Map of South Africa with Radiation Control offices ................................... 2  
          
Figure 1.2  Radiation Control organogramme ............................................................. 3  
 
Figure 2.1  Entity relationship .................................................................................... 28 
 
Figure 2.2  Entity relationship .................................................................................... 29 
 
Figure 2.3  Entity relationship diagram ...................................................................... 31  
 
Figure 2.4  Entity relationship diagram ...................................................................... 32   
 
Figure 2.5  Structure of the legal framework ............................................................. 58 
 
Figure 4.1  Respondents‟ position at Radiation Control ............................................ 80  
 
Figure 4.2  Respondents‟ use of database per week ................................................ 81  
 
Figure 4.3  SA Regulatory Authority‟s organisational structure ................................. 88  
 
Figure 4.4  Applications online submission and monitoring ...................................... 91 
 
Figure 4.5  Graded enforcement action process ....................................................... 92    
 
Figure 4.6  Importance of data consistency checking ............................................... 94   
 
Figure 4.7  Protection of vital data ............................................................................ 95  
 
Figure 4.8  Database as means for information dissemination ................................. 96  
XIII 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9  Catalogues interface .............................................................................. 97   
  
Figure 4.10  Online submissions of data by facilities.................................................. 98  
 
Figure 4.11  Essential technical services information................................................ 103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XIV 
 
 
 
ANNEXURES   
 
Annexure A   Approval from the university  
Annexure B  Letter seeking permission from the Department of Health: 
Directorate Radiation Control  
Annexure C  Letter of approval – DoH: Directorate Radiation Control     
Annexure D  Data collection tool 1 (Criteria Checklist)  
Annexure E  Letter of consent  
Annexure F  Data collection tool 2 (Questionnaire)  
Annexure G  Entity Relationship Diagrams (RAIS & Radiation Control databases)  
 
 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE – ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
For a radiation regulatory authority, adequate data management is essential to ensure 
effective management of its regulatory control programme. It is indeed needed to both 
keep the national register for radiation sources and to manage the large amount of data 
with which the regulatory authority is daily confronted, such as the data related to 
authorisation, inspection and enforcement processes (IAEA 2009c:2; Suman & Alhabbal 
2008:327).    
 
The South African Directorate Radiation Control (Radiation Control), through the 
Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973), is responsible for the regulatory 
control of radiation sources in South Africa. The database system used by Radiation 
Control to fulfil its mandate as a regulatory authority is divided into two databases. The 
„x-rays‟ database is used for the management of information pertaining to x-rays (or 
Group III radiation sources). The „isotopes‟ database is used for the management of 
radioactive sources (or Group IV radiation sources) information. The two databases are 
not linked and do not communicate with each other.  
 
This study seeks to explore and evaluate the database system used by the Radiation 
Control as a data management tool suitable to fulfil the functions required of the 
regulatory authority. 
  
 
1.2 BACKGROUD INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROBLEM   
 
1.2.1  Radiation Control in South Africa 
 
Radiation Control, as a radiation regulatory authority, is responsible for regulating the 
sale and use of radiation sources in South Africa. It falls under the National Department 
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of Health. It has its head office in Bellville, Cape Town and three regional offices also in 
Bellville, Pretoria and Durban (see figure 1.1 below).  
 
Radiation Control‟s mission statement is: “The promotion and maintenance of health 
within the framework of the National Health Plan and specifically the protection against 
injury or disease caused by technological devices, including sources of radiation, by 
furthering the safe and legal use of such devices” (Directorate Radiation Control 2013).  
 
Radiation Control‟s aim is: “To provide an appropriate standard of protection to all South 
African citizens against ionizing radiation without unduly limiting the beneficial practice 
giving rise to radiation exposure” (Directorate Radiation Control 2013).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of South Africa with the location of Radiation Control offices   
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The regulatory framework of Radiation Control has established legislation in the form of 
the Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973) and the accompanying 
Regulations. Figure 1.2 below outlines the Radiation Control regulatory infrastructure in 
South Africa through an organisational chart. 
 
                                                Department of Health 
                Minister:          
 
Director General: 
 
 
1 2 3   Health Planning & Monitoring  5 6  
              Deputy Director General:  
 
 
 1 2  Office of Standards Compliance  4 5 
    Chief Director:  
 
    Directorate Radiation Control   2  
    Director:  
 
Sub-Dir: Ionizing  Sub-Dir:    Sub-Dir: Licensing &     Sub-Dir: NIRMED  
Radiation  Radio-nuclides Inspections                 (Non-Ionizing 
Deputy Director:  Deputy Director:  Deputy Director:          Radiation &  
                                                                             Electro-Medical  
                   Devices)  
                           Deputy Director:                                       
 
                                                                                                             
              
Figure 1.2 Radiation Control Organogramme   
        (Adapted from http://sites.google.com/site/radiationcontroldoh/ 
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1.2.2 Current status of data management in Radiation Control   
 
Data are currently managed both in paper and electronic format in Radiation Control. 
There are hard copy files for licensees at regional offices and head office. Each regional 
office keeps files for those licensees that are under its direct control. There are also 
duplicate files for each of the licensees at head office.  
 
Information is entered in these files by inspectors when they conduct inspections or 
follow-ups. The administration officer/s may also enter or put a form or page/s in the file 
when they have answered a call or received data from the licensees by fax, e-mail or 
post. Some of the data, such advices with updated information after an inspection, are 
first sent by post to head office to be processed then returned to the relative regional 
office for filing.  
 
The database is managed at head office by the designated official who works as the 
database administrator (DBA). There are other staff members also at head office who 
have rights to enter data into the database as and when it is received from regional 
offices or directly from licensees (see section 4.3.1).     
      
1.2.3  The international Regulatory Authority Information System  
 
The Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) is a software application 
developed by the IAEA in order to help member states‟ regulatory authorities in 
managing their regulatory activities in accordance with IAEA Safety Standards and 
guidance (RAIS 2012). See section 2.3.  
 
RAIS has been developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of 
a supporting set of actions designed to assist countries in managing their regulatory 
control programmes. RAIS can assist the regulatory authorities in managing information 
related to both the national radiation sources inventory and their routine regulatory 
activities. It also covers the national regulatory infrastructure information, facilities and 
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departments, radiation events and accidents, occupationally exposed workers and 
technical services (IAEA 2009c:2).  
 
Since the IAEA introduced RAIS in 2004, more than sixty-four countries use RAIS on a 
regular basis. Whilst 26% of the countries use RAIS without modification, 74% have 
customized the system to varying degrees (IAEA 2009b:3; IAEA 2011:1).  
 
1.2.3.1  Current status of Radiation Control’s data management  
 
There has been little co-operation between the IAEA and South Africa‟s Radiation 
Control prior to 2010. As a result the data management tools used by Radiation Control 
are not compatible or related in any way to the RAIS program. The database systems 
used by Radiation Control do not, for instance, provide for an interface for connection to 
the International Catalogue of Sealed Radioactive Sources (ICSRS).    
 
The national register for radiation sources, where it exists, is essential in assessing the 
level of radiation safety in the country and the effectiveness of the regulatory 
programme. There have been several reports concerning lost or stolen radiation 
sources in the country while Radiation Control is not even aware of the situation. Even 
after the situation is reported, lack of full information on the database limits the ability to 
trace the licensee or the lost radioactive source (IAEA 2009b:2).  
 
Kahn (2011:3) reported that the Democratic Alliance (DA) had asked the IAEA to 
intervene and help track down more than 200 missing radioactive sources in this 
country. The same report indicated that Radiation Control has no idea where these 
radiation sources are, whether they are high or low risk, and whether there are 
additional sources that may exist. Reports also show that there is no reliable and 
accurate national register of radiation sources in South Africa. 
 
The researcher has, through working with the Radiation Control database for the past 
seven years, been exposed to its limitations. This might influence the researcher‟s 
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objectivity in the conduct of the study. In order to avoid this, the study has been 
supplemented with both database systems‟ functional requirements and specifications.  
The functional requirements and specifications have been used to cross-validate the 
questionnaire responses against the analysis.   
 
Within this context, it is relevant to investigate whether or not Radiation Control‟s 
database system is adequate and effective in supporting the required functions and 
performance of the regulatory programme.  
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
The research problem is to develop a methodological framework for the assessment 
and evaluation of a health software application using the South African Radiation 
Control Database as an example. 
 
 
1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY  
 
1.4.1 Research purpose  
 
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the theoretical and actual effectiveness of the 
current database system used by the Radiation Control when compared with 
international best practice, as reflected in RAIS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Research Objectives  
 
The objectives of the study are to:  
 
 Compare the functional and data storage capabilities of the current database 
system used by Radiation Control with RAIS.  
 Evaluate implementation experiences of the South African database system 
against the structural and functional features of the system.  
 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
Currently there is no consistent and common approach to the data management of the 
radiation regulatory control framework in South Africa. It is hoped that the results of the 
study will have implications on the way radiation regulatory control data is managed and 
thus contribute to radiation safety and security in the country, as well as the 
effectiveness of the regulatory programme.  
 
The results of the study will hopefully also highlight the need for a properly maintained 
register for radiation sources, which will lead to increased public health and safety. The 
results will also provide baseline information that can be used to re-engineer 
mechanisms to improve the level of radiation safety and security and the regulatory 
programme in the country. Finally, the results of the study may be used as a basis for 
further research related to policy implementation (Carson, Schetnan, Hasan & 
Mohamed 2008:58).        
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1.6 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS  
 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms were used as defined below:  
 
1.6.1 Authorisation  
 
According to the IAEA (2004a), authorisation means permission granted by a regulatory 
body to a natural or legal person (including a facility or department) who has submitted 
an application to manage a radioactive source.  
 
1.6.2 Database system   
 
A database system is an organisation of components that defines and regulates the 
collection, storage, management, and use of data in a database environment. The 
database system is made up of five major parts, namely, hardware, software, people, 
procedures, and data. A database is a shared, integrated computer structure that 
houses a collection of related data. It contains two types of data: end-user data (raw 
facts) and metadata (data characteristics and relationships) (Rob & Coronel 2007:18 & 
639).  
 
1.6.3 Management and radiation sources  
 
Management in this study means all activities, administrative and operational, that are 
involved in the manufacture, supply, receipt, storage, use, transfer, import, export, 
transport, maintenance, recycling or disposal of radioactive sources (IAEA 2003:31). 
A radiation source refers to a radiation generator: a device capable of generating 
radiation, such as x-rays, neutrons, electrons or other charged particles, which may be 
for scientific, industrial or medical purposes; and a radioactive source: is a radioactive 
material that is either permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded and in a solid 
form, including commercial radioisotopes in liquid form (IAEA 2003:31). 
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1.6.4 RAIS – Regulatory Authority Information System  
 
RAIS is a software application developed by the IAEA to assist member states in 
managing their regulatory activities (IAEA 2004a:3).  
 
1.6.5 The regulatory authority/body’s regulatory control  
 
Regulatory authority is described as an entity or organization or a system of entities or 
organizations designated by the government of a country or state as having legal 
authority for exercising regulatory control with respect to radioactive sources, including 
issuing authorizations, and thereby regulating one or more aspects of the safety or 
security of radioactive sources (IAEA 2004a:3).  
 
Regulatory control means any form of control or regulation applied to facilities or 
activities by a regulatory body for reasons related to radiation protection or to the safety 
or security of radioactive sources (IAEA 2004a:3). 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
A research design is “a blueprint for the conduct of a study that maximises control over 
factors that could interfere with the internal validity of the findings” (Burns & Grove 
2005:211). Research design and method comprise the overall plan for data collection 
and analysis (De Vos 1998:123; Polit & Beck 2008:694).  The research design used in 
this investigation is a mixed method approach, including a quantitative research design 
using a non-experimental, descriptive and evaluation approach supported by a 
qualitative analysis of the database metadata description. The research design and 
methodology will be discussed in more depth in chapter 3.  
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1.7.1 Population   
 
The population refers to all the elements (individuals, objects, or substances) that meet 
certain criteria to be included in a given universe (Burns & Grove 2005:40). The 
population also means the entire set of individuals having common characteristics in 
which a researcher is interested (Polit & Beck 2008:761).    
 
The study population in this study included all the records of the specifications of the 
database system and RAIS, and the users of the database at Radiation Control. (Refer 
to chapter 3).   
 
1.7.2 Sample and sampling  
 
A sample means a subset of the population which is selected for a study. Its members 
are called subjects. Sampling refers to the process of selecting a group of people, 
events, behaviours, or other elements for the purposes of conducting a study (Burns & 
Grove 2005:40; Polit & Beck 2008:339).  
 
All the employees of the Directorate Radiation Control, who use the database and 
consented to participate, were used in the study, largely because of the defined number 
of users of the system. The specifications applicable and relevant to the South African 
radiation regulatory framework were selected to be used as criteria to compare the 
database systems. (Refer to chapter 3). 
 
1.7.3 Data collection   
 
Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to the 
research purpose or specific objectives, questions, or hypotheses of a study. In 
quantitative studies it involves the generation of numerical data to address the research 
purpose or specific objectives and questions (Burns & Grove 2005:42; Stommel & Wills 
2004:362).  
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Data were collected using the specifications records of the two database systems and a 
questionnaire that served as a structured interview guide. (Refer to chapter 3).  
 
1.7.4 Data analysis  
 
Data analysis refers to the systematic organisation and synthesis of research data 
which, in quantitative studies, is the testing of hypotheses using the same data. Data 
analysis is conducted to reduce, organise and give meaning to data (Burns & Grove 
2005:733; Polit & Beck 2008:751).  
 
Qualitative metadata was analysed by comparing the fields supported by the two 
databases and the theoretical degree of database integrity. Quantitative data was 
analysed using the applicable descriptive statistic. (Refer to chapter 3).  
 
1.7.5 Validity and reliability  
 
Validity, in measurement, describes the degree to which an instrument measures that 
which it is meant to measure. Reliability means the extent of consistency or 
dependability with which an instrument measures an attribute (Polit & Beck 2008:764 – 
768). The measures to ensure internal and external validity and reliability in this study 
are described in chapter 3.   
 
1.7.6 Ethical considerations  
 
Ethics refers to the degree to which research and procedures adhere to professional, 
legal, and social obligations to the study participants (Polit & Beck 2008:753). Ethics is 
concerned with matters of right and wrong. Ethical considerations include the right to 
privacy and refusal to participate in the research; anonymity and confidentiality; full 
disclosure about the research, and not to be harmed in any manner.  
In this study, the researcher submitted the research proposal to the Higher Degrees 
Committee of the Department of Health Studies of Unisa (University of South Africa) for 
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approval. The researcher also obtained permission to conduct the study, and respected 
respondents‟ rights. The respondents were asked to sign a written, signed consent 
before participating in the study. Their names, phone numbers, addresses and other 
details were not included in the questionnaire which ensured confidentiality (refer to 
annexure A and annexure E).       
 
 
1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
Limitations are restrictions or problems in a study that may decrease the generalisability 
of the findings and may be theoretical and methodological (Burns & Grove 2005:39). 
The sample size of the respondents used in the study is small due to a small number of 
users or employees of the regulatory body, Radiation Control. The researcher does not 
have previous experience of working with RAIS.   
 
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and describes the problem, aim and significance of the 
study and the research design and methodology.  
 
Chapter 2 covers the literature review.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the research design and method. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the analysis, presentation and description of the research findings. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes the study and outlines some recommendations.   
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1.10 CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, the reader has been introduced to an investigation of the database 
systems for the management of radiation sources. The chapter covered the background 
information about the research problem, research problem, aim and significance of the 
study, definition of terms, research design and method, and scope of the study.   
 
Chapter 2 discusses the literature review.  
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The literature review focused on two main areas: database concepts and radiation 
sources.   
 
The database concepts refer to a database system that involves the database data 
collection with the database management system (DBMS). It also includes database 
and metadata features, the Radiation Control database system and its features, RAIS, 
and database schemas.  
 
Radiation sources refer to a radiation generator and a radioactive source. It includes 
radiation source applications, categorization of radioactive sources, ICSRS, lost or 
missing radiation sources, and the national register of radiation sources.  
 
A summary of the literature reviewed is provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
 
2.2 DATABASE CONCEPTS 
 
2.2.1 The database and the DBMS  
 
A database, in simple general terms, is an organised collection of data for one or more  
purposes, usually in digital form. The data are typically organised to model relevant 
aspects of reality, e.g. the list of licensees due for inspection, in a way that supports 
processes that require such information, e.g. finding a licensee with particular radiation 
source applications (Stair & Reynolds 2006:728).  
 
Rob & Coronel (2007:6) explain that the term database is correctly applied to the data 
and its supporting structures, and not to the DBMS. The DBMS is a collection of 
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programs that manages the database structure and controls the access to the data 
stored in the database. The database data collection with the DBMS is called a 
database system (Rob & Coronel 2007:7; Stair & Reynolds 2006:728). 
 
The DBMS is the system in which related data is stored consistently and according to a 
model that has been proven to have integrity and support data storage and reporting. A 
relational database management system (RDBMS) stores data according to a relational 
model that has been proven to support data storage and reporting when stored in a 
normalised format. The phrase „related data‟ means that the data stored pertains to a 
particular schema design, in this case, the relational model. A dimensional database 
stores data according to a model that is optimised for data querying (Stair & Reynolds 
2006:206; Rob & Coronel 2007:6 & 547).   
 
The term „database system‟, state (Rob & Coronel 2007:6–7), implies that the data are 
managed to some level of quality that is measured in terms of accuracy, availability, 
usability, resilience and integrity. This in turn often implies the use of a general-purpose 
DBMS. A general-purpose DBMS is typically a complex software system that meets 
many usage requirements and supports databases that are often large and also 
complex. The most common general-purpose DBMS is the RDBMS (Stair & Reynolds 
2006:731).  
 
The use of databases and DBMSs is now widespread such that most organisations and 
companies, from small to large, heavily depend on databases for their operations and 
the development their technology and products. Well known RDBMSs include Oracle, 
IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, MySQL and SQLite. A database is not 
generally portable across different DBMS, but different DBMSs can inter-operate by 
using standards such as the Structured Query Language (SQL) and the Open Database 
Connectivity (ODBC) to support a single application (Rob & Coronel 2007:36; Stair & 
Reynolds 2006:735).  
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Some general-purpose DBMSs, like Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, and IBM DB2, have 
been developed over a period of many years. General-purpose DBMSs aim to satisfy as 
many applications as possible. This means that DBMSs support a particular database 
schema, for example the relational database schema. Specialised databases are 
created by configuring a general-purpose DBMS to support specified data model and 
data storage.   
 
An active database is a database that includes an event-driven architecture that can 
respond to inputs from both inside and outside the database. Possible uses include 
security monitoring, alerting, statistics gathering and authorization. Most modern 
relational databases include active database features in the form of database triggers, 
procedural code that is automatically executed in response to certain events on a 
particular table or view in a database (Rob & Coronel 2007:611).  
 
A general objective of a database is to provide a single integrated store of information in 
the company (Rob & Coronel 2007:593). 
 
2.2.2 Database features   
 
Features commonly offered by DBMSs include query ability, backup and replication, 
rule enforcement, security, computation, change and access logging, and automated 
optimization. 
  
Querying is the process of requesting attribute information from various perspectives 
and combinations of factors. A database query language and report writer allow users to 
interactively interrogate the database, analyze its data and update it according to the 
users‟ privileges on data. An example of this is: “How many sealed radioactive sources 
are in Gauteng?” (Rob & Coronel 2007:430; Smith 2006:S15 – S17).      
 
In backup and replication, copies of data attributes need to be made regularly in case 
primary disks or other equipment fails. A periodic copy of data attributes may also be 
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created for a distant organization that cannot readily access the original. The DBMS 
usually provide utilities to facilitate the process of extracting and disseminating data 
attribute sets. When data are replicated between database servers, so that the 
information remains consistent throughout the database system and users cannot tell or 
even know which server in the DBMS they are using, the system is said to exhibit 
replication transparency (Rob & Coronel 2007:604; Wikipedia Database management 
system ... 2012). 
 
Rule enforcement refers to the concept that data attributes are always expected to be 
stored in a way that maintains the data integrity and reliability and this is enforced by the 
database schema and other rules on the data. For example, there may be a rule that 
says each radiation source can have only one generator, identified by a serial number, 
associated with it. If somebody tries to associate a second generator with a given 
source, we want the DBMS to deny such a request and display an error message (Rob 
& Coronel 2007:602; Wikipedia Database management system ... 2012; Smith 
2006:S16).   
 
Security is one of the main features of a database to protect against unauthorised 
access to private data.  For security reasons, it is desirable to limit who can see or 
change specific attributes or groups of attributes. This may be managed directly on an 
individual basis or by the assignment of individuals‟ and groups‟ privileges. In the most 
elaborate models, role-based access is through the assigned to individuals and groups 
who are then granted entitlements (Rob & Coronel 2007:592; Wikipedia Database 
management system ... 2012).  
 
A DBMS may support standard computations requested on data attributes, such as 
counting, summing, averaging, sorting, grouping, cross-referencing, etc. Rather than 
have each computer application implement these from scratch, they can rely on the 
DBMS to supply such calculations (Rob & Coronel 2007:426; Wikipedia Database 
management system ... 2012).  
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Change and access logging captures data concerning the person or roles that has 
accessed particular data attributes, as well as any changes, and when the changes 
were made. Logging services allow this by keeping a record of access occurrences and 
changes. In automated optimization, those frequently occurring usage patterns or 
requests may be optimised by a DBMS. In some cases the DBMS will merely provide 
tools to monitor performance, allowing a human expert to make the necessary 
adjustments after reviewing the statistics that are collected (Stair & Reynolds 2006:206; 
Wikipedia Database management system ... 2012).  
 
2.2.3 The Radiation Control database system 
 
The Directorate Radiation Control currently uses an Oracle Database 10g Std Edition. 
Cyran et al (2005) describes the Oracle database as “a collection of data treated as a 
unit”. The purpose of which is to store and retrieve related information. A database 
server is important in solving the problems of information management, and it also 
prevents unauthorised access and provides efficient solutions for failure recovery 
(Cyran et al. 2005).  
 
A server, in general, manages a large amount of data in a multiuser environment so that 
many users can concurrently access the same data. This simultaneous access of the 
same data by many users is known as data concurrency (Cyran et al. 2005).  
 
Cyran et al (2005) mention that Oracle includes software mechanisms which help it fulfil 
three main important requirements of an information management system: 
 
2.2.3.1 Data concurrency of a multiuser system must be maximized  
 
The main concern of a multiuser database management system is how to control 
concurrency, that is, the simultaneous access of the same data by many users. Without 
adequate concurrency controls, data could be updated or changed improperly, 
compromising data integrity (Cyran et al. 2005).  
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2.2.3.2 Data must be read and modified in a consistent fashion  
 
Data access consistency means that the data that a user is viewing or changing are not 
changed, by other users, until the user is finished with the data. This is called read 
consistency, and as supported by Oracle, guarantees that the data set are consistent 
and do not change during statement execution. Read consistency also ensures that 
readers of database data do not wait for writers or other readers of the same data, and 
vice versa. It also ensures that writers only wait for other writers if they attempt to 
update identical rows in concurrent transactions (Cyran et al. 2005).  
 
2.2.3.3 High performance is required for maximum productivity from the many 
users of the database system   
 
This is achieved through firstly, locking mechanisms in which Oracle uses locks to 
control concurrent access to data. Secondly, quiesce database is when a database 
system is put into a quiesced state in which the database administrator can safely 
perform certain actions whose executions require isolation from concurrent non-DBA 
users. Thirdly, Real Application Clusters (RAC) combines the processing power of these 
multiple interconnected computers to provide system redundancy, near linear 
scalability, and high availability. Lastly, Oracle provides unique portability across all 
major platforms and ensures that applications run without modification after changing 
platforms (Cyran et al. 2005).  
 
2.2.4 Radiation Control database features 
 
Oracle (2004) states that the “Oracle Database Standard Edition is optimised for 
deployment in medium-sized business environments”. It is supported on either a single 
server supporting up to a maximum of 4 CPUs (central processing units), or on a 
clustered server environment, with a total maximum of 4 CPUs in the cluster. Oracle 
Database 10g Standard Edition is available on all Oracle‟s supported operating 
systems, including Windows, Linux and UNIX (Oracle 2004).  
20 
 
 
 
Oracle Database Standard Edition is preconfigured for production usage, and comes 
with automated space, storage and memory management, automatic backup and 
recovery, and automatic optimizer statistics management. It has a built-in Enterprise 
Manager 10g Database Control console that provides a web-based interface that shows 
at a glance, the current status of the database and cluster environment, and allows 
database administration actions from any browser connected to a system (Oracle 
2004).  
 
Oracle Database 10g Standard Edition supports all standard relational data types, as 
well as native storage of Extensible Mark-up Language (XML), Text, Documents, 
Images, Audio, Video and Location data. Data are accessed through standard 
interfaces such as SQL, Java Database Connectivity (JDBC), SQLJ, DBC .Net, Object 
Linking and Embeding (OLE .Net) and Oracle Data Provider (ODP .Net), SQL/XML and 
XQuery, and Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV). Stored procedures 
deployed in the database can be written in both Java and Procedural Language 
(PL/SQL). Oracle Database 10g Standard Edition also provides built-in analytical, 
statistical and modeling capabilities that can be used in any SQL based Business 
Intelligence environment (Oracle 2004).    
 
Oracle Database Standard Edition provides for robust support for database roles, 
auditing, and data encryption, which in turn provides strong access control and 
accountability to address your security and privacy needs (Oracle 2004).   
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2.3 REGULATORY AUTHORITY INFORMATION SYSTEM – RAIS 
 
RAIS promotes a consistent and common approach to the regulatory control of radiation 
sources (RAIS 2012). RAIS offers flexibility and customizability which allow regulatory 
bodies to respond to specific needs of their countries with regard to the national 
legislative framework, administrative structure, and institutional and regulatory 
framework (IAEA 2009b: 2).  
 
In order for a regulatory body to effectively maintain the national register for radiation 
sources, development of adequate data management tools is required to facilitate data 
storage, analysis and follow-up actions. Adequate data management is also essential 
for assessing the level of radiation safety and security in the country and the 
effectiveness of the regulatory programme (IAEA 2009b:2).  
 
RAIS 3.0 was initially developed in a Microsoft (MS) Access environment, and then 
extended for implementation on SQL Server platforms. Then RAIS 3.1 Web which offers 
a web based environment with remote access, access by authorized representatives of 
facilities, enhanced data access through functional and data roles, multilingual 
capability, enhanced incident module and public communication was released (IAEA 
2009b:2 – 4). As of February 2012, RAIS 3.2 Web which offers additional features that 
enhance the managerial aspects of RAIS and add more flexibility to the customization 
options was released (RAIS 2012).   
 
RAIS is a comprehensive database system covering by default all main areas of the 
regulatory framework. These are: national regulatory infrastructure information; facilities 
and departments; radiation sources and associated equipment; authorisation, 
inspection; enforcement; workers; radiation events; and technical services (RAIS 2012).  
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2.3.1 Features and advantages of RAIS  
 
RAIS offers a wide range of customization to respond to the specific needs of countries‟ 
national legislative and regulatory framework. For example: the scope such as data 
tables and data fields; interface controls such as menus and data filters; background 
functionalities such as data consistency checks and data protectors; and reporting and 
data analysis tools (RAIS 2012).  
 
The main advantages of RAIS are:  
 Compatibility with the IAEA Safety Standards,  
 Extensive customizability which young regulatory bodies may use as a guide or 
model to establish their regulatory program, while mature ones may tailor the 
system according to their own national system,  
 Data consistency checking to reduce human errors,  
 Regulatory activities description as processes, providing a link to the regulatory 
body management system and processes such as authorisation, inspection and 
enforcement,  
 Protection of vital data against unintentional modification or deletion,  
 Access control to protect data against unauthorised access and to ensure data 
confidentiality – enhanced by functional roles and data roles in RAIS 3.1 Web and 
RAIS 3.2 Web,  
 A means for information dissemination to the public which the regulatory body can 
customise according to its policy,  
 Includes catalogues on manufacturers and models of sealed sources, radiation 
generators and associated equipment,  
 A secure interface for connection to the ICSRS in RAIS 3.1 Web and RAIS 3.2 
Web,  
 Online submission of data by the facilities, subject to validation by the regulatory 
body in RAIS 3.1 Web and RAIS 3.2 Web, and  
 Significant savings as a ready-made database, especially for developing nations.  
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The regulatory body has a huge responsibility requiring execution of a lot of tasks and 
dealing with loads of data and information. RAIS is a database created by the IAEA to 
help regulators track every parameter associated with their activities. RAIS combines 
the strengths of an extensive inventory and a detailed record of national expertise. It 
stores information on every radiation source and the facility in which it is used, plus 
records of licenses and registration. It also has a complete record of personnel and 
users qualifications and the radiation doses received by individuals in occupational or 
medical settings (Thematic Safety Areas 2012).       
 
Suman (2011:3) says that recent consultations between the IAEA and its member 
states recommended including the National Register of Occupational Doses (NROD) 
within the default scope of the RAIS. Although the primary scope of RAIS is the control 
of radiation sources, its technical feasibility and wide use proves that it can serve as a 
platform for establishing an NROD and be a viable and effective option.  
 
In the implementation of the NROD, the use of RAIS customisation tools and features 
proved to be efficient and effective in making the NROD interface easier to use and 
more user-friendly. RAIS customisation features also proved, for example, their efficacy 
in producing reports (Suman 2011:5 – 6).  
 
2.3.2 Other countries’ implementation and use of RAIS 
 
As of December 2011, more than seventy countries are using RAIS on a regular basis. 
Of these 26% use RAIS without modification and 74% have customized the system to 
varying degrees (RAIS 2012).   
 
Suman & Alhabbal (2008:328) report that Syria is one of the first countries which started 
using RAIS 3.0 as the MS Access version and, later on, the SQL Server version. This 
provided for RAIS‟ initial and continuous testing with bulk data in day-to-day work in 
Syria. Although it proved to be a powerful tool for managing regulatory activities, the 
daily application with massive data indicated a need for further improvement in its scope 
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and interface. Therefore numerous enhancements were made to RAIS in Syria, using 
the RAIS 3.0 Creator or the advanced customisability option and some „intrusion‟ 
(modification) of the core system. This was done with careful consideration to keeping 
compatibility with the original RAIS 3.0.  
 
In Egypt, the RAIS Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) was developed as part of a 
barcode-based system implementation to track radioactive sealed sources (RSS). The 
system allows users in the field to verify RSS data, gather RSS audit information, and 
upload that data to the RAIS database. The main purpose of the system is to protect 
human health and environment in Egypt from mismanaged RSS through 
comprehensive RSS management capabilities development. The program includes an 
automated cradle-to-grave tracking of RSS in use and in storage through 
implementation of the RAIS database (Carson et al 2008:1-2).  
 
In the program: RAIS tracks authorization, licensing, import/export, use, and disposal of 
RSS; manages activities such as inspections and audits; Provides a template for RSS 
management that can be customised to meet individual national needs and regulatory 
requirements; and is available on the internet and/or web based. Carson et al (2008:2) 
further reports that in order to completely automate RSS tracking in Egypt: software had 
to be developed to allow two-way communication between the RAIS database and a 
PDA; and a barcode identification system to uniquely identify all RSS in the country was 
needed.  
 
However the RAIS PDA Application does not provide mechanisms for adding a sealed 
source, in its current form. Therefore sealed sources must be added to the system by 
using the RAIS database software before and soon after data consolidation for 
synchronisation between RAIS PDA Application and RAIS, and to prevent data integrity 
problems (Carson et al 2008:2).    
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The Department of Authorization, Inspection and Regulation (DAIR) of the Lebanese 
Atomic Energy Commission (LAEC) is using RAIS 3.1 Web software to manage their 
regulatory programme (Regulatory Authority Information ... 2011).  
 
The objective of using this software is: to keep registry/records of LAEC regulatory data 
such as facilities, radiation sources, workers and doses; to manage the regulatory 
information; to manage the regulatory activities such as authorizations, inspections and 
enforcement; and data analysis tools such as sources inventory and follow-up as well 
as practice profiles (RAIS 2012).    
 
In Sudan, the Sudanese Atomic Energy Commission (SAEC) uses RAIS 3.0 which is 
designed primarily as a tool for the management of information related to the regulatory 
control of radiation sources. (Regulatory Authority Information ... 2008) also states that 
RAIS 3.0 can also be used as guidance for developing, assessing and improving the 
regulatory authority‟s quality assurance programme.  
 
In Ghana, the Radiation Protection Institute (RPI) as national regulatory authority 
coordinates the activities of all relevant agencies concerned with radiation and 
radioactive sources utilisation. The RPI uses RAIS to track radioactive sources and 
wastes generated by collecting statistics on sources imported into and exported from 
Ghana. Radiation sources and radioactive waste inventory have also been established 
using RAIS and Sealed Radiation Sources Registry System (SRS) (Gbadago, Fletcher, 
Kyere, Adu, Schandorf, Glover, Anim-Sampong, Addo and Dagadu 2005:97-98; Adu, 
Gbadago and Glover 2003:1).  
 
The Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) uses RAIS for the purposes of the 
National Radioactive Source Tracking System. In this system a licensee reports on all 
information of manufacture, transfer, receipt, export or disposal of sources (Nigerian 
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Regulations, 2006, Paragraph 20(1)).  
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When Hua and Hao (2000:4-5) did a study on the radiation sources database 
establishment in China, they recommended RAIS as a good reference to use. They 
further said that most of the contents in the Chinese radiation sources database will be 
the same as the RAIS system. The study recommended that a joint research team 
study RAIS and consider the Chinese practice and domestic situation. Then a national 
database of radiation sources would be established with reference to the experiences of 
the IAEA‟s RAIS and other member countries of IAEA.   
 
2.3.3 Database Schemas  
 
A schema is a description of the entire database. In other words, schema is the 
structure of the database that defines the objects in the database (Stair & Reynolds 
2006:207; Oracle 2005).    
 
Rob & Coronel (2007:219) describe a schema as a group of database objects, like 
tables, indexes, views, and queries, which are related to each other. Schemas provide a 
logical grouping of database objects by function or owner and can enforce a first level of 
security by allowing the user to see only the objects (e.g. tables) that belong to him/her.  
 
Therefore a database schema of a database system is its structure as described in a 
formal language supported by the DBMS. It refers to the organisation of data to create a 
blueprint of how a database will be constructed. The database administrator specifies, 
according to his/her applications‟ knowledge, the facts that can enter the database or 
those of interest to the possible end-users (Stair & Reynolds 2007:206; Oracle 2005).  
  
Entities, attributes, relationship, and constraints are the basic building blocks of all data 
models. An entity is anything, e.g. a person, a thing, or an event, about which data are 
collected, stored, and maintained. An attribute refers to a characteristic of an entity. A 
relationship describes an association among entities. A constraint refers to a restriction 
placed on the data (Rob & Coronel 2007:30; Stair & Reynolds 2006:731).  
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An entity relationship model (ERM) is a data model that describes relationships among 
entities at the conceptual level using an entity relationship diagram (ERD). An ERD is a 
diagram that depicts an ERM‟s entities, attributes, and relations (Rob & Coronel 2007: 
643). According to Stair & Reynolds (2006:730), an ERD refers to a data model that use 
basic graphical symbols to show data organisation and relationships.  
 
Comparing the relational and ER diagrams of the two databases (South African 
Regulatory database and the RAIS) gives an indication as to their data storage 
capabilities (see Figure 2.1 to Figure 2.4 below). 
 
2.3.3.1 Radiation Control Database  
 
In an Oracle database system, a schema is associated with each database user and a 
schema object is a logical data storage structure. A schema comprises a collection of 
schema objects. Examples of schema objects include tables; views; sequences; 
synonyms; indexes; clusters; database links; snapshots; procedures; functions; 
packages. Non-schema objects may include users; roles; contexts; and directory 
objects (Oracle 2005; Rob & Coronel 2007:219).  
 
Below are two examples of abridged ER diagrams of the Radiation Control database. 
For full ERDs refer to annexure G: 
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Figure 2.1 Entity Relationships – Isotope Schema 
(Adapted from  
http://oracape3.health.gov.za:7778/portal/page?_pageid=33,1065&_dad=portal&_sche
ma=PORTAL)  
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Figures 2.2 Entity Relationships – X-Rays Schema  
(Adapted from  
http://oracape3.health.gov.za:7778/portal/page?_pageid=33,1065&_dad=portal&_sche
ma=PORTAL)  
 
Building of an ERD usually requires an understanding of the entities about which the 
organization needs to store information as well as the attributes of those entities and the 
relationships between them. It also involves identifying the business rules and the 
operational requirements (Rob & Coronel 2007:124–125). Business rules refer to brief, 
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precise, and unambiguous descriptions of policy, procedure, or principle in a certain 
organisation.  
 
2.3.3.2 RAIS  
 
RAIS is available in several versions: RAIS 3.0 with SQL Server Extensions (supports 
MS Access as well as SQL servers); RAIS 3.1 Web; & RAIS 3.2 Web. RAIS 3.2 Web 
was released in February 2012 and it features extended data access controls, 
enhanced implementation of the roles and responsibilities as assigned within the 
regulatory body, extended ability to produce reports and certificates, and an enhanced 
implementation of enforcement as a regulatory process. The new version also has 
some additional customisation features (RAIS 2012).  
 
Below are two examples of ER diagrams of the RAIS database pertaining to similar 
structures contained in the SA regulatory Oracle database. For other RAIS ERDs refer 
to annexure G: 
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Figure 2.3 Entity Relationship Diagram – Radiation Generators 
                  (Source: IAEA 2009c)  
 
The ER diagrams of RAIS appear to be well designed and the database‟s extensive 
customisability feature means that the database can be adapted extensively. As a 
database that is supporting radiation regulatory bodies, RAIS ER diagrams demonstrate 
familiarity and relevance in terms of business rules, and data modeling features.  
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Figure 2.4 Entity Relationship Diagram – Source–Equipment Association 
                  (Source: IAEA 2009c)  
 
The entity names of all tables, entities and attributes appear to satisfy best practices in 
naming conventions. The entities represent a single subject and are in third normal form 
(3NF) level relationship to one another. The granularity of the entity instances is clearly 
defined. The primary key (PK) is clearly defined in all tables and supports the selected 
level of data granularity. There is a clear foreign key (FK) in each table as a reference to 
a related entity. Types of relationships, and connectivities and cardinalities are clearly 
indicated in the relevant entity relationships (IAEA 2009c:30–31; Rob & Coronel 
2007:110–202).  
 
The time stamp attribute records the explicit order in which transactions are submitted 
to the DBMS. Time stamping is a technique used in scheduling concurrent transactions, 
in transaction management, that assigns a unique time stamp to each transaction and 
can also be used to implement an audit trail that is potentially an important feature of a 
database with legal application. A transaction refers to a sequence of database 
operations, i.e. one or more database requests, that accesses the database (Rob & 
Coronel 2007:653).  
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All RAIS database tables have the time stamp attribute (RAIS_TIME_STAMP) in them. 
Time stamps must have two properties of uniqueness, which ensures that no equal time 
stamp values can exist, and monotonicity, which ensures that time stamp values always 
increase. The functions of time stamps include stopping, rolling back, and re-scheduling 
conflicting transactions (Rob & Coronel 2007:415).     
 
The disadvantage of time stamping approach is that each value stored in the database 
requires two additional time stamp fields. Time stamping also increases memory needs 
and the database‟s processing overhead. However the power and storage capabilities 
of modern computers ensure that these are not really significant limitations compared to 
the value of having a database that implements regulatory compliancy.    
 
 
2.4 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A DATABASE APPLICATION 
 
Functional requirements for a database application refer to a set of inputs, the 
behaviour, and outputs. Functional requirements define functions or specific behaviours 
such as calculations, technical details, data manipulation and processing and other 
specific functionality that specify what a system is supposed to accomplish (Rob & 
Coronel 2007:215 – 268; OFIN Functional requirements ... 2013).  
 
The functional requirement document is also called functional specifications or 
functional requirement specifications and defines the capabilities and functions that a 
(database) system must be able to perform successfully (Rob & Coronel 2007:65 – 90; 
OFIN Functional requirements ... 2013; Tsiknakis, Grangeat, Binz, Potamias, Lisacek, 
Gerfault, Paulus, Manakanatas, Kritsotakis, Kondylakis, Perez, Plexousakis, Kaforou & 
Kafetzopoulos 2007:6065 – 6069).         
 
The functional requirement specifications for a database system should include:  
 Descriptions of data to be included into the system;  
 Descriptions of operations performed by each screen;  
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 Descriptions of work-flows performed by the system;  
 Descriptions of system reports or other outputs;  
 Who can enter data into the system; and   
 How the system meets applicable regulatory requirements.  
 
The functional specifications and the system should be understood by the general users 
or readers without them needing any particular technical knowledge to do so.  
 
As mentioned above, the functional requirements should include the functions that are 
performed by specific screens and the outlines of work-flows performed by the system. 
It should also cover other business, regulatory or compliance requirements that the 
system must meet. These include interface; business; regulatory/compliance; and 
security requirements (OFIN Functional requirements ... 2013; Stair & Reynolds 
2006:555 – 652)).   
 
2.4.1 Interface requirements  
 
As many other systems, the database system needs to provide data for other systems 
or for users. The system may also require data from other systems. Identifying the 
interface requirements involves:  
 Identify the sources of required data;  
 Identify the data items and data structures required for the exchange;  
 Consider alternatives or select methods of data exchange;  
 Identify relevant protocols for the data exchange; and  
 Document or reference the technical requirements for data exchange including: the 
source; data items; data structures; timing, method; and protocols. 
 
Examples of interface requirements include: field accepts numeric data entry; screen 
can print on-screen data to the printer; and field only accepts dates before the current 
date (Rob & Coronel 2007:347 & 547; OFIN Functional requirements ... 2013).    
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2.4.2 Business requirements  
 
Business requirements define what must be done to achieve value. Examples of 
business requirements include that: data must be entered before a request can be 
approved; all personnel using the system will be trained accordingly; and clicking the 
Approval Button moves the request to Approval Workflow (OFIN Functional 
requirements ... 2013).   
 
Rob & Coronel (2007:31) define a business rule as a precise, unambiguous, and brief 
description of a policy, procedure, or principle within a specific organisation. Business 
rules describe the business polices that apply to the data stored on a company‟s 
databases. Some business rules are especially important to the database designer 
because they can be incorporated into the logical schema of the database. The 
database designers apply certain constraints to ensure that the database honours the 
company‟s business rules. The business rules constraints also help preserve data 
integrity. They are divided between two categories: field constraints within tables, and 
relationship constraints between tables (Relational Database Design 2013; Stair & 
Reynolds 2006:21 – 36).  
 
2.4.3 Regulatory/Compliance requirements  
 
Applicable legislation and regulations require organisations to safeguard data and prove 
compliance. The regulations mainly include requirements for ensuring privacy, integrity 
and confidentiality of data, and accountability for change, as well as implementation of 
audit and security controls to protect regulated data (Application Security Inc. 
Regulatory and Industry Compliance 2013).   
 
Examples of regulatory/compliance requirements include that: the database will have a 
functional audit trail; the system will limit access to authorised users; and the 
spreadsheet can secure data with electronic signature. The primary controls are: 
sensitive data access auditing; privileged user monitoring; development and 
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maintenance of secure Web applications (OFIN Functional requirements ... 2013; 
Application Security Inc. Regulatory and Industry Compliance 2013).   
 
2.4.4 Security requirements   
 
Different categories of requirements are appropriate depending on the system being 
described. Database security requirements arise from the need to protect data: first, 
from accidental loss and corruption, and second, from deliberate unauthorised attempts 
to access or alter that data. Security means protecting the data against accidental or 
intentional use by unauthorised users (Rob & Coronel 2007:592; Oracle. Database 
Security Guide – Security Requirements, Threats and Concepts 2013).  
 
Examples of database security requirements include that:  
 Members of the Data Entry group can enter requests but not approve or delete 
requests;  
 Members of the Managers group can enter or approve a request, but not delete 
requests; and  
 Members of the Administrators group cannot enter or approve requests, but can 
delete requests.     
 
The functional specifications describe what the system must do, and how the system 
does it is described in the design specifications (Rob & Coronel 426 – 484; OFIN 
Functional requirements ... 2013).    
 
2.4.5 Overview of application architecture  
 
There are two common ways to architect a database, namely client/server or multitier 
architecture. A distributed database management system (DDBMS) manages the 
storage and processing of logically related data over interconnected systems. Both data 
and processing, in these systems, are distributed among several sites (Oracle 2005; 
Rob & Coronel 2007: 456).  
37 
 
 
 
2.4.5.1 Client/Server architecture  
 
In multiple-site processing, single-site data (MPSD) approach, multiple processes run 
on different computers sharing a single data repository. Multiprocessing uses more than 
one processor for a set of related jobs. This distributed processing reduces the load on 
a single processor by allowing different processors to concentrate on a subset of related 
tasks. This in turn improves the performance and capabilities of the system as a whole 
(Rob & Coronel 2007:465; Oracle 2005).  
 
The client, or front-end, database application is the one that initiates a request for an 
operation to the database server. The client requests, processes, and presents data 
which is managed by the server. The client workstation can be optimised to its job, runs 
on a different computer than the server, and many can simultaneously run against one 
server (Oracle 2005; Rob & Coronel 2007:466).  
 
The server, or back-end, application typically has large memory and storage capacities, 
along with fast and efficient communications abilities. The server receives and 
processes request statements from client applications. The computer that manages the 
server can be optimised for its duties. Server systems consists of multiuser computers 
such as supercomputers, mainframes, and severs (Stair & Reynolds 2006:124; Oracle 
2005).     
 
2.4.5.2       Multitier architecture  
 
The multiple-site processing, multiple-site data (MPMD) scenario refers to a fully 
DDBMS with capabilities for multiple data processing and transaction processing at 
multiple sites. A multitier architecture has the following components:  
o A client or initiator process that starts an operation;  
o One or more application servers that perform parts of the operation;  
o An end or database server that stores most of the data used in the operation;  
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The application server provides access to the data for the client and performs some of 
the query processing, which removes some of the load from the database server. The 
application server can also serve as an interface between clients and multiple database 
servers, and also provide additional security (Rob & Coronel 2007:466; Oracle 2005). 
 
The multitier architecture enables the use of an application server to: 
o Validate the credentials of a client, such as a Web browser;  
o Connect to a database server; and  
o Perform the requested operation on behalf of the client.  
 
2.4.6 Functional model  
 
Stair & Reynolds (2006:13) define a model as an abstraction or approximation that is 
used to represent reality. A functional model, in this case, refers to a structured 
representation of the functions, i.e. activities, actions, processes, operations, within a 
defined or modelled system or subject area. The purposes of the functional model 
involve: to describe the functions and processes; help with information needs discovery; 
assist identify opportunities; and establish a basis for determining product and service 
costs (Rob & Coronel 2007:312 – 351).      
 
2.4.6.1 Radiation Control database functional model  
 
An Oracle database is a collection of data treated as a unit. The purpose of a database 
is to store and retrieve related information. A database server is the key to solving 
problems of information management (Oracle 2005).  
 
A schema is a collection of database objects. Rob & Coronel (2007:219) describe a 
schema as a group of objects, such as tables and indexes, which are related to each 
other. Schema objects are logical structures that directly refer to the database‟s data. 
The most common schema objects include structures like tables, indexes, views, 
clusters, and synonyms (aliases). Indexes are optional structures associated with 
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tables. Views are customised presentations of data in one or more tables or other views 
(Oracle 2005; Rob & Coronel 2007:219 – 224).    
 
Tables are a basic unit of data storage in an Oracle database, wherein data is stored in 
columns and rows. A table is defined with a table name, such as licensees, and a 
set of columns. Each column is given a column name, such as licensee_id, 
last_name and authority_no, a datatype, such as VARCHAR2, DATE, or NUMBER, 
and a width. Datatype refers to a certain meaningful representation of data inside the 
computer as a pattern of 1s and 0s. The width can be predetermined by the datatype, 
for example in DATE. Precision and scale instead of datatype are defined if a column is 
of NUMBER datatype. A row is a collection of column information corresponding to a 
single record (Oracle 2005; Patrick 2002:231).          
 
The rules for each table column, called integrity constraint, are specified. For an 
example NOT NULL integrity constraint forces the column to contain a value in every 
row. SQL statements are used to insert rows of data after a table has been created. 
SQL is an ideal database language in that it allows one to create database and table 
structures, perform basic data management chores (add, delete, and modify), and 
perform complex queries that transform raw data into useful information. SQL can also 
used to query, delete, or update table data (Oracle 2005; Rob & Coronel 2007:215) 
 
One of the most important parts of an Oracle database is its data dictionary, which is 
the central set of read-only reference tables and views of each Oracle database. Stair & 
Reynolds (2006:209) define a data dictionary as a detailed description of all the data 
used in the database. The data dictionary contains: 
o The definitions of all schema objects (tables, views, sequences, procedures, 
functions, and so on) in the database;  
o The name of the data item, aliases or other names that may be used to describe the 
item;  
o The range of values that can be used, and default values for columns;  
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o The names of Oracle users, a notation of the person responsible for updating data  
item and the various users who can access it;  
o Privileges and roles each user has been granted;  
o Auditing information, such as who has accessed or updated various schema objects;  
o A list of reports that use a particular data item; and  
o Other general database information.  
 
The data dictionary can also include a description of data flows, the way records are 
organised, and data processing requirements (Stair & Reynolds 2006:209; Oracle 
2005).   
  
2.4.6.2 RAIS functional model  
 
RAIS can be used as a default system or it can be customised according to the national 
administrative, legal, and regulatory structure. The customisation may involve changes 
to the regulatory system settings without altering the table structure, queries, or 
interface. It may also include customisation of the tables, queries, or interface (Suman. 
2012). (See section 2.3.3.2 above).   
 
Access to RAIS is subject to an authentication process, user name and password, 
which provides for data confidentiality and operation tracking. Data confidentiality is 
ensured by restricting access to RAIS to users having specific permissions. The 
concept of assigning user permissions is based on data and functional roles (IAEA 
2009e).  
 
The data role filters data from the database. Any data that is not covered by the 
permissions of the data role is filtered out and thus not accessible to the user assigned 
to that data role. The functional role governs which masks the user can access and 
what operations (view, add, edit, and delete) can be performed by the user on each of 
the masks. Functional roles also specify the level of validation required for the data 
entered by the user (Suman 2012; IAEA 2009e).  
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2.4.6.2.1 User types  
 
RAIS provides for five preconfigured combinations of data roles and functional roles in 
the form of user types:  
 
o Administrator – users of this type have full access to RAIS including adding, 
modifying, deleting, and viewing all data, modifying regulatory system model, and 
modifying regulatory system data;  
o Regulator – these users have full access to the input menu which allows them to 
view, modify, add, and delete all regulatory data;  
o Restricted Access Regulator – these users have similar access permission as the 
Regulator but their access to the input menu is restricted to view only;  
o Licensee – users of this type are authorised representatives of facilities, who have 
full permissions in the input menu masks. They are however only allowed to access 
data related to their facility; They are allowed to add, edit, and delete any data 
related to their own facility subject to the regulatory body‟s validation process; and 
o Guest – this user type is only allowed to view global and public information.  
 
RAIS administrators are also allowed to define users into the RAIS system and assign 
access permission. RAIS regulators have only view permissions to the Regulatory 
System menu, are not allowed to alter regulatory system data, and the administration 
menu is not accessible to them. Licensees have view access to the global and public 
information but no access to the administration menu and non-public regulatory system 
data (IAEA 2009e).  
 
The public data, by default, are collected in the statistics menu and the two menu items, 
namely Co-operation and Co-ordination, and Regulatory Reference, of the submenu 
Regulatory System/Regulatory Reference. RAIS also provides for a generic user type, 
named „Other‟, which is applicable to all users for whom different combination of data 
roles and functional roles is required (IAEA 2009e).        
 
42 
 
 
 
2.4.7 An ideal Radiation Control database system  
 
Based on the researcher‟s experience at Radiation Control, the views of the fellow 
colleagues and the literature review, an ideal Radiation Control database should be as 
follows (see sections 2.2 to 2.4 above): 
 
o The database should be tailor made for the radiation regulatory authority or it should 
be customisable to conform with the national legislative frameworks, administrative 
structures, and institutional and regulatory frameworks;  
o The database should be a relational Web based and equipped with a translation 
mechanism so that it is multilingual;  
o Its scope should be comprehensive to cover all the main areas of the regulatory 
framework (national regulatory infrastructure information, facilities and departments, 
radiation sources and associated equipment, authorisation, inspection, enforcement, 
workers, radiation events, and technical services);  
o It should be  compatible with relevant international standards such as the IAEA 
Safety Standards;  
o The database should be equipped with data consistency checking to reduce human 
errors;  
o It should also have strong data security measures (including access control) to 
protect data against accidental or intentional use by unauthorised users;   
o It should also be able to protect vital data against unintentional modification or 
deletion;  
o The database should provide a means for information dissemination to the public, 
with the public area customised according to the regulatory body‟s policy; and  
o The database should have extensive support base in terms of updates, technical 
services (maintenance and training), installations, and customisation of the system.      
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2.5 RADIATION SOURCES  
 
Radiation sources, including both radioactive materials and radiation generators, are 
used throughout the world for a wide variety of peaceful purposes including medicine, 
industry, agriculture, science, research and education. They are also used for various 
military purposes (IAEA 2003:1).  
 
The International Basic Safety Standards (BSS) establish basic requirements for 
protection against the risks associated with exposure to ionizing radiation and for the 
safety of radiation sources that may deliver such exposure. BSS also provide an 
internationally harmonised basis for ensuring the safe and secure use of ionizing 
radiation sources (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2003:1).  
 
2.5.1 Categorisation of radioactive sources  
 
Since there is a wide variety of uses and activities of radiation sources, a categorisation 
system is necessary so that controls applied to sources are commensurate with the 
radiological risks involved (see Table 2.1 below). The categorisation of sources seeks to 
provide a fundamental and internationally harmonised basis for risk-informed decision 
making and to assist in many activities related to the sources safety and security, such 
as: 
 
 Developing and refining international and national safety standards;  
 Developing and refining national regulatory infrastructures to meet national 
circumstances;  
 Optimising decisions about priorities for regulation within resource constraints;  
 Optimising security measures for radioactive sources, including potential malicious 
use;  
 Emergency planning and response; and  
 Developing national strategies for control over radioactive sources;  
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This categorisation applies mainly to radioactive sealed sources used in medicine, 
industry, agriculture, research and education. However it can be equally applied to 
some sources under military control and unsealed radioactive sources. The 
categorisation is not relevant to radiation generators such as x-ray machines, particle 
accelerators, nuclear materials, sources within military or defence programmes, disused 
radioactive sources waste management, radioactive material packages in transport, and 
applications where factors like specific activity, chemical properties and half-life are 
considered (IAEA 2003: 2; IAEA 2009:4-6).   
 
There are five categories of sources and four security groupings have been identified for 
these source categorisations: 
 
Table 2.1 Source Categorization and Security Groups  
 
Security Group Source Category Examples of Practice  
 
 
          A 
 
 
           1 
 Irradiators  
 Teletherapy  
 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)  
 Fixed multi-beam teletherapy (gamma knife)  
 
          
         B 
 
           2 
 Industrial Radiography  
 High/medium dose rate brachytherapy  
 
           3 
 Fixed gauges (e.g. Level, dredger, conveyer)    
 Well logging gauges  
 
 
 
          C 
 
 
 
 
           4 
 Low dose rate brachytherapy (except those in Security 
Group D)  
 Fill / Thickness gauges  
 Portable gauges (e.g. moisture / density)  
 Bone densitometers  
 Static eliminators  
 
 
          D 
 
 
           5 
 Low dose rate brachytherapy eye plagues and 
permanent implant sources 
 X-Ray fluorescent (XRF) devices  
 Electron capture devices 
 
(Source:  http://www.aelb.gov.my & http://ansn.aelb.gov.my) 
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2.5.2 Role of a Regulatory Programme  
 
The regulatory control programme‟s role is an important one in providing adequate 
oversight of safety in the use of radiation sources for purposes such as medical, 
industrial, agriculture, research, and education practices. The primary purpose of a 
regulatory programme is to provide an appropriate standard of protection and safety for 
humans without unduly limiting the benefits of the practice giving rise to the exposure 
(IAEA 2004b).  
 
Radiation sources with an activity that is above exemption levels that are set by the 
national and international standards must be accounted for from the moment they are 
acquired to the day they are retired, i.e. from manufacture to disposal or cradle-to-grave 
tracking system. At this point standards for radioactive waste disposal must be strictly 
followed (IAEA 2007:4).    
 
The requirements for an adequate national radiation safety infrastructure, in compliance 
with international standards, comprise five thematic safety areas (TSAs):   
 
2.5.2.1 Regulatory Infrastructure  
 
The first step is to establish legislation that allows beneficial or justified uses of ionising 
radiation and provides for adequate protection of people and the environment. The 
legislation must provide a mechanism that achieves such an aim through the 
establishment of a regulatory body or authorities which must be provided with adequate 
human and financial resources. The legislation also provides principal requirements and 
enforcement instruments to address non-compliance. Regulations provide detailed 
requirements or further detail on the application of the laws. One of the most important 
tasks of the regulatory body is to have a system of notifications, authorisations, 
inspection and enforcement. This includes the creation and maintenance of an accurate 
national register of all radiation sources (IAEA 2007:6; IAEA 2004b).   
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(a) Legislative Framework    
 
The legal framework will depend on individual national circumstances, namely:  
 The overall legal system;  
 The procedure for issuing regulations;  
 The legislative body, e.g. governing the functioning of the regulatory authority;  
 New or additional legislation, e.g. replacing old legislation; and  
 Overlaps, conflicts or gaps in coverage of radiation protection and safety, e.g. in 
RSA where there is more than one regulatory authority – interagency co-ordination 
and co-operation.    
 
The legislation, e.g. Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973), is established 
by the national legislative body. The legislation then establishes fundamental structures 
and concepts, the infrastructure of regulatory control, defines the structure of the legal 
framework for radiation protection, and sets out the scope of the legislation and the 
principal protection and safety requirements (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:5-6).  
 
The legislation should recognise that radiation uses introduce important benefits in 
medicine, industry and research. It should also recognise that exposure to radiation 
might cause harmful health effects to people and that people‟s health and safety must 
be protected while permitting beneficial uses of radiation. The legislation should also 
provide for exclusions and exemptions of which specific criteria and values must be 
defined in regulations (IAEA 2007). 
 
Performance regulations give general requirements, and specify overall radiation safety 
requirements and basic operational parameters. Prescriptive regulations give detailed 
requirements, and state how to achieve radiation safety. Most regulations are both 
performance and descriptive oriented and they give precise parameters in areas such 
as notifications, authorisations, inspections, and enforcements (IAEA 2007).  
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A notification may refer to a document submitted to the regulatory authority by a legal 
person (of a facility or department) to notify it of an intention to acquire or use radiation 
sources. A notification is the basic mechanism which provides information to the 
regulatory authority about a proposed action. An application for authorisation may also 
serve as notification. Apparatus exempted by the regulatory authority require notification 
(conditional exemption) (IAEA 2007).  
 
Categorisation of sources is used in the authorisation process so that controls to be 
applied should be commensurate with the radiological risks that the sources and 
materials present. Of particular concern are those radiation sources which have the 
potential for causing significant harm to persons or have the potential for widespread 
contamination. Categorization is also a tool that can be used in authorization and other 
relevant decision-making processes.  
 
Inspections can satisfy the regulatory body that the licensee complies with the 
legislation, regulations and any imposed conditions; facilities, equipment and work 
performance comply with requirements; persons employed by the operator, including 
contractors, possess the necessary competence; and deficiencies and deviations are 
identified and corrected (or justified) without undue delay. 
 
Enforcement is an action taken by the regulatory authority to require a registrant, 
licensee or other responsible party to correct matters of non-compliance with regulatory 
requirements. Where appropriate, the application of penalties (prosecution, suspension 
or cancellation of the authorization/license, confiscation of the radiation sources, etc.) 
may be used as enforcement (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:5-6).  
 
Exclusions mean that some sources are not amenable to regulatory control, e.g. 40K in 
human body; cosmic radiation at the surface of the earth; and low concentrations of 
naturally occurring radionuclides in raw materials. Some practices and sources may be 
exempted from regulatory control requirements including those of notification and 
authorization. Some may be exempted from procedural requirements of regulations to 
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accommodate a specific situation, provided that the same level of protection and safety 
can be achieved by alternative methods (see Table 2.2 below). Exemptions shall not be 
granted to practices deemed not to be justified (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:5-6).  
 
Table 2.2  Exemption 
 
 
  Nuclide   Activity Concentration   Activity  
                                              Bq g-1                                               Bq      
     
      3H       1 x 106    1 x 109 
      7Be       1 x 103     1 x 107  
      14C       1 x 104     1 x 107  
      15O       1 x 102     1 x 109         
                                                         
(Source:  http://www.aelb.gov.my & http://ansn.aelb.gov.my)  
 
(b) Regulations  
 
Regulations are more specific in terms of radiation protection and safety requirements. 
They are developed by the regulatory authority and issued by the legislative body, 
Ministry or regulatory authority, depending on the national legal system. They apply to 
practices and sources within practices.  
 
The regulation, in its broadest sense, encompasses the introduction and conduct of any 
practice involving radiation sources. It is however a task that can only be fulfilled by 
defining precise parameters in different areas such as notification, authorisation, 
inspection and enforcement. These are four key processes the Regulatory Authority 
must oversee to fulfil its mandate to regulate the introduction and conduct of any 
practice involving radiation sources (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:5-6; Thematic Safety 
Areas 2012).        
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(c) Codes of Practice, Guidelines  
 
They are practice specific requirements or guidelines which are usually developed and 
issued by the regulatory authority. They give practice specific advice on how to achieve 
protection and safety defined in legislation or regulations. They may or may not be 
legally binding which means that there may be other procedures available that can be 
followed to achieve the same protection and safety goals (IAEA 2004b).  
 
2.5.2.2 Radiological Protection in Occupational Exposure  
 
There are millions of employees around the world who come into contact with or actively 
apply radiation sources. Employers and licensees hold full responsibility for employees‟ 
health and safety, including individual and workplace monitoring; health surveillance 
and occupational exposure records; general radiation protection information and 
workers‟ training; personal protective equipment (PPE) provision and following strict 
procedures for personal exposure monitoring (IAEA 2007:9).  
 
The regulatory body must oversee regulations that cover both dose limits and the 
implementation of a systematic approach to optimising radiation protection. This 
includes ensuring that monitoring and measurement services are duly accredited and 
delivering reliable results. The regulatory authority also plays a vital role in protecting 
workers through its power to conduct inspections and suspend or revoke licenses where 
failure to comply with set standards exists (IAEA 2007:9).  
 
The regulatory authority must seek, as its objective with regard to radiation occupational 
safety, to foster a safety culture that is encouraged by management and supported by 
staff, including the assessment of controlled and supervised areas, the provision and 
use of appropriate protective devices and the provision of personal radiation monitoring. 
The radiation protection measure must be adequate to the source (IAEA 2004b; 
Thematic Safety Areas ... 2012).  
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2.5.2.3 Radiological Protection in Medical Exposure  
 
The regulatory body‟s objective here is to provide the knowledge and skills necessary to 
apply the basic principles of optimization and justification for diagnostic and 
interventional radiology procedures as related to patient doses (IAEA 2004b).  
 
Medical procedures form the most common cause through which people are exposed to 
artificial radiation. Medical practitioners have the prime responsibility for ensuring 
radiological protection of patients. This involves justification and optimisation for the 
particular use of radiation. All medical radiology procedures must be justified by 
weighing the diagnostic benefits they produce against the radiation detriment they might 
cause, taking into account the benefits and risks of available alternative techniques that 
do not involve radiation exposure. Optimisation means that the objective of patient 
protection in diagnostic and interventional radiology must be to maximize the margin of 
benefit over the potential risk, taking into account social and economic circumstances 
(IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:9-10).  
 
Calibrations are to be performed before the first use of a radiation source on patients, 
after maintenance and at intervals prescribed by the regulatory authority. 
Radiopharmaceuticals are calibrated in terms of the activity to be administered. 
Calibrations (measuring equipment and radiation sources) are to be traceable to a 
laboratory recognized by the regulatory authority (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:11).   
 
2.5.2.4 Public and Environmental Radiological Protection  
 
Regulation of public and environmental exposure has the same aim as medical and 
occupational exposures, to protect people from the adverse effects of radiation. The 
only difference is the additional „everywhere‟ and „now and the future‟ dimensions that 
apply to the public and environmental radiological protection. People and the 
environment are constantly exposed to low levels of ionizing radiation, mostly from 
natural sources and some human activities.  
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Potential sources of public and environmental radiation exposure from human activity 
can be divided into two categories: radioactive effluents and radioactive waste. 
Radioactive effluents can be in gas or liquid form and are discharged into the 
atmosphere or water. Radioactive waste represents all disused material and equipment 
that contain some elements of radioactive substances.  
 
Effective control of public and environmental radioactive hazards depends on the 
establishment of a regulatory infrastructure, which clearly defines policies for clearance 
from regulatory control, discharge control and waste management. Management of 
radioactive waste includes arrangements for the return of spent sealed sources to the 
manufacturer; and transferring the waste to local storage, disposal facility or a licensed 
waste management organization (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2007:10-11).   
 
2.5.2.5 Emergency Preparedness and Response  
 
Minimising the impact of radiological emergencies requires fast action on the part of 
many individuals, from first responders like the police, fire-fighters, civil defence and 
medical personnel to the regulatory body and senior government officials. A vital aspect 
of the radiation protection infrastructure is the establishment of procedures and training 
personnel for emergencies.    
 
Emergency preparedness means being ready to respond to a broad range of situations 
that can occur anytime, anywhere. Wide spread use of nuclear technologies in diverse 
applications such as industry, medicine, and agriculture, means that smaller amounts of 
radioactive material are found on more sites. It also means that there are more sites 
susceptible to external impacts such as flooding, fire, or accidents caused by human 
error (Thematic Safety Areas 2012).  
 
The role of the regulatory authority should be specified in national emergency 
preparedness plans. The regulatory authority needs training programs; equipment; 
facilities; logistic support; and funding in order to be able to  implement its role and 
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functions in emergency response. Licensees have the primary responsibility for 
emergency response. However, the regulatory authority, together with other appropriate 
organizations, should have plans to co-ordinate and implement support for protective 
actions. The regulatory authority may have a specific role in off-site emergency 
situations where a licensee is not directly involved (IAEA 2004b; Thematic Safety Areas 
2012).  
 
2.5.3 National register of radiation sources  
 
Establishing and maintaining an inventory of radiation sources can be challenging and 
time consuming (see Table 2.3). One of the roles of the regulatory authority is to 
actively seek out sources already in use or conduct a thorough search for disused 
sources as well as „orphan‟ sources. Radiation sources already in use may or may not 
be registered and orphan sources are those that have been improperly disposed of or 
for which it is impossible to identify the owner (Thematic Safety Areas 2012). 
 
According to the IAEA, the number of sealed radioactive sources worldwide is in the 
millions. However the existing registries show a much smaller number. There is a 
significant discrepancy between the estimated number of radioactive sources worldwide 
and the number of those actually registered. The reasons for this discrepancy include 
missing records of sources manufactured and distributed a long time (decades) ago; 
lack of comparison between records and physical inventories, i.e. verification of data; 
and lack of continuity of regulatory control, e.g. in the case of transferring sources to 
another user or illegal disposal of disused sources (IAEA International Conference 
2003:278-279).  
 
The radioactive source that is no longer needed or has become unfit for the intended 
use is classified as a spent or disused source. However the activity of a disused source 
may still be of the order of GBq or TBq (giga- or tera- Becquerel). Incidents and 
accidents with a wide range of consequences, including widespread contaminations and 
deterministic health effects, however have occurred as a result of spent radioactive 
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sources that have not been kept under regulatory control and technically sound 
management (IAEA International Conference 2003:278).  
 
Deterministic radiation effect is the effect of ionising radiation leading to a functional loss 
of irradiated organ or tissue. This occurs if sufficient cells are killed or prevented from 
reproducing or functioning due to radiation. The seriousness of the loss of organ 
function is directly proportional to the number of cells affected, a threshold dose for 
deterministic effect exists, which must be exceeded for an effect to occur. The degree of 
pathological severity increases rapidly with the radiation dose. The deterministic 
radiation effects include skin reddening, eye lens opacity and permanent sterility 
(European Nuclear Society. Deterministic radiation effect. 2012).   
 
The number of sources excluded from regulatory control does not depend on the 
countries‟ industrial development. However, the reasons for not having or losing control 
over sources are different between developing and developed countries.  In developing 
countries, the problem often originates from the fact that the sources were imported 
before proper national legislation and regulatory control were introduced and the 
country‟s technical infrastructure and expertise were still limited. Although both the 
regulatory and technical infrastructure is in place, in developed countries, there is such 
a large number of sources that even if a small percentage of them is lost or 
unaccounted for, it can amount to a significant number (IAEA International Conference 
2003:278-279).  
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Table 2.3 National Register of Radiation Sources  
 
Radioactive 
Sources 
Category of radioactive sources  X-Ray 
generators and 
Accelerators 
Sealed (S)  1 2 3 4 5 Other  
(unknown activity)  
 
 
 
In medicine and 
Industrial 
radiography 
practices  
       
Unsealed  
(U) 
       
 
(Source:  IAEA 2009d:9)  
                                                               
It is necessary to analyse the whole life-cycle of the sources in order to identify when 
the sources are most vulnerable. The main phases of the life-cycle of sources are:  
 Manufacturing (e.g. production of radionuclide, encapsulation, equipment 
manufacturing);  
 Distribution to users (e.g. transportation, storage);  
 Application period (e.g. medical, therapy, industry, etc);  
 Transition period(s); and  
 Disused/spent sources.  
 
Manufacturers, distributors and users are not likely to lose the source, especially while it 
is still in their care. Therefore these phases are not so critical from the source control 
view point. The weak points of the life-cycle are when the sources are in the transition 
phase and when they become disused.  
 
In South Africa there are all classes of radiation sources as shown in Tables 2.1 and 
2.3. There is however no reliable or accurate register of radiation sources. The number 
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of missing radiation sources and their details, such as source type and activity are also 
unknown.    
 
2.5.3.1 Sources in transition  
 
Sources are in transition when they are transported, temporarily out of use, waiting for 
another application/user, or taken out of service but not declared as waste. The 
transportation of radioactive material/sources is usually under proper regulatory control. 
It is also in the carrier‟s interest that the consignment reaches its destination. If a source 
is temporarily out of use but the user intends to use it again for the original purpose, 
proper control is usually ensured. However the level of control may decrease when the 
source is not intended to be used for the original purpose anymore, but is stored with 
the aim of another application use or transferring it to another user. The same applies 
when the source is taken out of service but is not declared as waste but just stored for 
an indefinite period (IAEA 2009d:280). 
 
2.5.3.2 Disused/spent sources  
 
The main causes for sources becoming disused are radioactive decay, leaking or 
damage, obsolete equipment, alternate technology, or changes in priority.  
 
The source not being used for the original purpose due to radioactive decay is usually 
the most common case. It is important however that the user maintains the same level 
of control for such a source until it is removed from the facility as its activity may still be 
in the order of GBq or TBq. The same applies in cases when the equipment containing 
the source is removed from the source or the whole application becomes obsolete 
and/or changed. Immediate action must be taken to isolate the area and to remove the 
damaged or leaking equipment or source from the user‟s facility by a qualified and 
authorised organisation (IAEA 2009d:280-281).   
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2.5.3.3 Orphan sources  
 
An orphan source is a radioactive source which is not under regulatory control, either 
because it has never been under regulatory control, or because it has been abandoned, 
lost, misplaced, stolen or otherwise transferred without proper authorization (IAEA 
2009d:59).  
 
Radioactive sources, as already mentioned, become orphaned if regulatory and 
physical control is lost over them. An example is when a source is placed in storage 
without notifying the regulatory authority, and then it is moved to another store with less 
physical control. Knowledge about the source degrades in time and eventually it lands 
in scrap storage and leaves the facility as scrap metal. Once it is mixed with scrap metal 
of another origin, it is almost impossible to track its origin. IAEA (2009d:281) says that 
typical problems with orphan sources include:  
 
 Appearance at an unexpected location and time (usually in a public area and the   
environment);  
 Unknown owner (need for an organisation to render the source safe);  
 No technical documentation (need for technical capability to identify, transport, 
further manage); and  
 Lack of financial resources (for collection and further management).  
 
 
2.6 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
The primary purpose of a regulatory program is to provide an appropriate standard of 
protection and safety for humans without unduly limiting the benefits of the practice 
giving rise to the exposure (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2003:1).  
 
Relevant international organisations that play a major role in the field of radiation 
protection include the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and 
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the IAEA. These organisations have established fundamental radiation protection 
principles, recommendations and standards.   
 
The International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionising Radiation and 
for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) are jointly formulated and sponsored by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); IAEA; International 
Labour Organization (ILO); Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development NEA); Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO); and World Health Organization (WHO).     
 
The type of a regulatory system adopted in a country depends on its size, the 
complexity and safety implications of the regulated practices and sources, and the 
regulatory traditions in the country.  
 
The main areas of the regulatory framework include the national regulatory 
infrastructure information, facilities and departments, radiation sources and associated 
equipment, authorisation, inspection, enforcement, workers, radiation events, and 
technical services.  
 
2.6.1 National Regulatory Infrastructure  
 
The implementation of the standards requires that a regulatory authority be established 
by the government to regulate the introduction and conduct of any practice involving 
sources of radiation. The regulatory authority should implement a national regulatory 
programme for the control of radiation sources.    
 
The national regulatory infrastructure for radiation protection should be based on a 
safety culture, a safety-based attitude, and recommendations from international 
organisations along with the requirements of the national regulatory authorities. The 
infrastructure is comprised of legislation, regulations, a regulatory authority, and general 
provisions or services (see Figure 2.7 below).  
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The Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act 15 of 1973) and the Regulations are used 
for the regulatory control of radiation sources and associated equipment by the 
Directorate Radiation Control of South Africa.  
  
                                                                                              Legislation                                    
  
 
 
                                                                                              Regulations 
 
 
 
 
                Codes of practice  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Structure of the Legal Framework 
(Source: IAEA: 2004) 
 
2.6.2 Facilities and Departments  
 
There are many radiation facilities and departments of different applications operating 
worldwide. Radiation protection at all facilities consists of several basic elements: facility 
design; worker training, procedures, and supervision; and regulatory oversight (US 
EPA. Facility Safety and Environmental Impact 2012).  
 
For all facilities, stationary and mobile, shielding of the radiation source is a key aspect 
of radiation protection. The amount of shielding necessary depends on the strength of 
the radiation source. Facility designs must also include multiple safeguards to protect 
worker health and the community should a natural disaster like an earthquake, fire, or 
tornado occur.  
Principal requirements 
Detailed requirements 
Practice specific 
requirements or 
guidance  
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Facility regulation depends on the type of radiation source used. All radiation facilities 
must meet the requirements of the regulatory authority, such as the Directorate 
Radiation Control in case of South Africa. The main licensing requirements facilities 
must meet include: a design that incorporates multiple fail-safe measures; extensive 
and well documented safety procedures; and extensive worker training.  
 
2.6.3 Workers and Radiation events  
 
Licensees and/or employers are responsible for ensuring that all workers engaged in 
activities that involve or could involve occupational exposure to radiation are protected 
and monitored (see Table 2.4). Radiation exposure benefits or costs must be balanced 
with detriments through justification, optimization and limitation.  
  
The justification of a practice implies doing more good than harm. The use of 
recognised dose limits implies an adequate standard of protection even for the most 
highly exposed individuals. The optimization of protection implies maximising the margin 
of good over harm (ALARA – As Low As Reasonably Achievable).  
 
Workers must also be provided with suitable and adequate facilities, equipment and 
services for protection. They must also be provided with and properly trained in the use 
of appropriate protective devices and monitoring equipment. Appropriate training as well 
as periodic retraining and updating must also be provided to workers.  
 
The main causes of radiation accidents include an inadequate regulatory framework in 
respect of authorisations, inspection and enforcements; and poor user safety culture in 
areas such as management, quality control and training and qualifications of personnel.  
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Table 2.4 Occupational Dose Limits  
 
  Effective Dose Limits 
20 mSv per year  
50 mSv in any 12 month period  
Equivalent Dose Limits  
Lens of the eye 150 mSv per year 
Skin 500 mSv per year 
 
(Source:  IAEA 2003:1)  
 
2.6.4 Technical Services  
 
The technical services that are needed within or accessible to the regulatory 
infrastructure for an effective regulatory programme implementation must be clearly 
identified and their details available on the database. These include dosimetry services, 
analytical services, calibration services, radioactive waste management services, 
training services, and accreditation for services.  
 
Essential technical services should be available to the authorised radiation users and to 
the regulatory authority locally (within the country) or through arrangements from 
outside the country (IAEA 2004b; IAEA 2003:1).  
 
2.6.4.1 Dosimetry Services  
 
For the assessment of external and internal doses, the accuracy and reliability of 
dosimetry service providers should be verified by the regulatory authority or by an 
acceptable third party organisation, i.e. an accredited third party service provider.  Only 
those dosimetry service providers recognised by the regulatory authority should be 
authorised to provide services in the country.  
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The purpose of monitoring is to exercise control over individual dose; identify 
abnormally high doses; identify changes in working conditions; identify poor working 
practices; provide legal evidence; and provide security and confidence in safety 
procedures.  
 
Employers must make adequate arrangements with a recognised dosimetry service 
provider to ensure that workers in controlled areas (radiation workers) are individually 
monitored.  
 
2.6.4.2 Analytical Services  
 
Analytical services should be able to provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis 
capability for radiation measurements that are commensurate with the radiation safety 
needs of the country; and recognised by the regulatory authority (possibly with external 
accreditation).   
 
These include leak testing; identification of radionuclides; assessment of activity/activity 
concentration; and products/sources testing against national and international 
standards.  
 
2.6.4.3 Calibration Services  
 
Calibration services should use standards traceable to recognised national and 
international standards (ISO, IAEA, IEC). The services should also be recognised by the 
regulatory authority, possibly with external accreditation. Calibration service providers 
should use the same criteria and similar protocols.  
 
Radiation surveys and/or measurements are performed to verify safe working 
conditions; confirm that sources are appropriately shielded; check that area 
classifications are satisfactory; maintain control of contamination; and satisfy regulatory 
requirements.  Radiation monitors must be calibrated regularly.  
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2.6.4.4 Waste Management Services  
 
Radioactive waste management facilities including long term storage and/or disposal 
must be available locally or through arrangements outside of the country.   
 
2.6.4.5 Training Services  
 
Training services for radiation users must satisfy the needs described in the users‟ 
radiation protection programme. They may also need to be recognised by the regulatory 
authority, possibly with external accreditation.   
 
Training services need to provide different levels of training, for example: users and 
technicians; Radiation Protection/Control Officers; qualified experts; and line managers 
and employers. Formal qualifications may be required. Expert assistance may be 
required to support investigations by regulatory authority staff, and to advise radiation 
users.      
 
 
2.7  SUMMARY 
 
A review was performed of the relevant literature on the topic of regulatory databases 
for radiation and nuclear sources.  
 
The following keywords and combinations of keywords were used: radiation sources 
database, radiation regulatory framework, radiation safety and protection, authorisation; 
inspection and enforcement, RAIS, etc.  
 
Literature reviews were conducted in a number of physical and online databases, 
including the following: EBSCO Host, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, PubMed, Health 
Physics, McGraw Hill, Sabinet, etc. Relevant South African and international legislation, 
regulations, statutes, policies and procedures were also searched.  
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The researcher also searched the UNISA library and enlisted the help of the librarians. 
Several searches were conducted on the internet, specifically for definitions of certain 
terms (Wikipedia) and technical information.  
 
 
2.8 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter discussed the literature review conducted on database systems, RAIS and 
radiation sources to provide an insight into what is known about the use of database 
systems as a data management tool of radiation sources by regulatory authorities.  The 
literature review revealed that a database is an important part of data and information 
management in a radiation regulatory control setup. It also showed that RAIS, as a 
database specifically tailor-made for regulatory bodies by the IAEA, is the most 
commonly used and might be more self-developed and consistent than other database 
systems used for this purpose.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the research design and method used in this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This study was undertaken with the view of providing guidelines that may be used to 
improve data and information management at the South African radiation regulatory 
body, Radiation Control, in order to improve radiation safety, security and protection for 
the public and the environment. A mixed-methods approach, including quantitative and 
qualitative methods was used to guide the research process.  
 
This chapter describes the research design and method, sampling, population, data 
collection and analysis, ethical considerations, and validity and reliability.  
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
     
Polit and Beck (2008:66) describe a research design as an overall plan for obtaining 
answers to the research questions that have been posed and an explanation of how the 
researcher intends to cope with the difficulties that will occur during the research 
process. A research design is “a blueprint for the conduct of a study that maximises 
control over factors that could interfere with the validity of the findings” (Burns & Grove 
2005:211; Polit & Beck 2008:765).  
 
The type of design directs the selection of a population, sampling procedure, methods 
of measurement, and a plan for data collection and analysis (Burns & Grove 2005:40). 
According to Stommel and Wills (2004:32-33), a research design is “a plan according to 
which the research will be carried out. It specifies what observations to make or which 
variables to focus on, how to make them or which measurement procedures to adopt, 
and when to make them”. The research design outlines a plan or blueprint as to how the 
researcher will conduct the research (Polit & Beck 2008:66).  
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A non-experimental descriptive comparative design was used to generate data for this 
study. The design provided the researcher with an opportunity to gain a holistic view of 
the phenomenon and to identify the factors affecting the effectiveness of the database 
systems for a radiation regulatory body. The data obtained from the respondents were 
analysed using applicable statistical procedures. 
 
The respondents‟ responses were also cross-validated against the actual structure and 
functional differences between the two database applications.  
 
3.2.1 Non-experimental  
 
The main purpose of non-experimental research is to describe phenomena and explore 
relationship between variables. In non-experimental studies, the researcher only makes 
observations and collects data, and does not attempt to intervene in any way to alter the 
phenomena of interest (Stommel & Wills 2004:144). Non-experimental designs are 
often used in certain studies because some human characteristics cannot be subjected 
to experimental manipulation due to ethical implications (Polit & Beck 2008:271 – 272).  
 
In this study, a non-experimental research design was used since the researcher 
wanted to observe, describe and document factors affecting the effectiveness of 
database systems as data and information management tool of a radiation regulatory 
authority.   
 
3.2.2 Descriptive  
 
According to Polit & Beck (2008:274), the purpose of descriptive studies is to observe, 
collect, and document aspects of a situation as it naturally occurs. A descriptive study 
involves the identification of a phenomenon of interest and the variables that contribute 
to the phenomenon. It also provides a method for developing conceptual and 
operational definitions of the variables and for describing the variables themselves 
(Burns & Grove 2005:232; Polit & Beck 2008:274). Descriptive studies entail the 
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collection, analysis and interpretation of data. They also provide baseline information 
and are used to gain more information about characteristics within a particular field of 
study. The distinctive feature of this approach is that its primary concern is with 
description rather than with the testing of hypotheses or proving causality (Burns & 
Grove 2005:232).  
 
The descriptive approach allowed the respondents to express their experience and 
situations while also assisting the researcher to describe and identify the factors 
affecting data and information management by the regulatory body using the database 
system. The researcher also systematically selected and reviewed literature that 
provided conceptual and operational definitions, and examined and described the 
phenomenon that is being studied (Burns & Grove 2005:232 – 241; Polit & Beck 
2008:274 – 276).    
 
3.2.3 Comparative  
 
Comparative research, simply put, is the act of comparing two or more things with a 
view to discovering something about one or all of the things being compared. According 
to Polit & Beck (2008:204), in most studies, especially quantitative ones, researchers 
incorporate comparisons into their designs to provide a context for interpreting results. 
Researchers can structure their studies so as to examine different types of 
comparisons.  
 
In this study, the researcher used a between-subjects comparison design to provide for 
a context to understand the findings. This was done by comparing the current Radiation 
Control database with RAIS using the specification records of the two database 
systems. The researcher also developed functional requirements for the database 
system needed in Radiation Control based on own and colleagues‟ experiences. The 
comparative study of the database systems was used to provide the context within 
which to understand and interpret the user acceptance study. 
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3.3 RESEARCH METHOD  
 
The research method includes the population, sampling, data collection and data 
analysis.  
 
3.3.1 Population  
 
Polit & Beck (2008:67 & 337) describes the population as all the individuals or objects 
with common, defining characteristics, that is, the entire aggregation of cases in which 
the researcher is interested. The population is also all the elements (individuals, objects, 
or substances) that meet certain criteria for inclusion in a given universe (Kaplan [1964]; 
Kerlinger & Lee [2000] in Burns & Grove 2005:40). It is the population from which the 
study sample is drawn or selected. The study population includes the entire group of 
persons, objects or events which meet the criteria that are of interest to the researcher 
(Babbie 2007:190; Polit & Beck 2008:339).  
 
All the employees of the Directorate Radiation Control who use the database and 
agreed to take part in the study were included as the study population. Of the thirty-
three database users approached to participate in the study and agreed to do so, one 
did not return the questionnaire. The other user pulled out of the study due to being new 
and inexperienced with the Radiation Control database.      
 
3.3.1.1 Sampling   
 
Sampling refers to the process for selecting a group of people, events, behaviours, or 
other elements with which to conduct a study in order to obtain information on the 
phenomenon of interest (Brink et al 2006:124; Burns & Grove 2005:341; Polit & Beck 
2008:339). 
 
In order for each person in the target or accessible population to have an equal 
opportunity to be selected for the sample, they have to be identified and listed. This 
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listing of members of the population is referred to as the sampling frame. The sampling 
frame is a comprehensive list of the sampling elements in the target population from 
which the sample is drawn (Brink et al 2006:124; Burns & Grove 2005:346).  
 
In this study, the sampling frame was derived from all the registered employees of the 
Directorate Radiation Control who are users of the database. All registered employees 
of Radiation Control who use the database were targeted for the study. The total 
population was therefore sampled by selecting all those database users that consented 
to participate in the study.   
  
3.3.1.2 Sample  
 
The sample size for this study was thirty-one Radiation Control employees who are all 
the users of the database system, except for the two, mentioned above, who declined to 
participate.    
 
3.3.2 Data collection  
 
Data refer to pieces of information that are collected during a study (Burns & Grove 
2005:733). Data collection is the precise, systematic gathering of information relevant to 
the research purpose or specific objectives, questions, or hypotheses of a study. 
Quantitative research involves the generation of numerical data to address the research 
purpose or specific objectives and questions (Burns & Grove 2005:42; Stommel & Wills 
2004:362).  
 
The data necessary to meet the objectives of this study were obtained in two phases. 
Firstly the researcher used specification records of both database systems, Radiation 
Control‟s and RAIS, to complete a criteria-checklist. The checklist includes the database 
features which are applicable to a radiation regulatory authority and are used to 
compare the two database systems. 
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In completing the checklist, the researcher enlisted the services of two colleagues from 
the Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority (ERPA) and the Namibia Atomic Energy 
Board (NAEB) as well as an official of the IAEA who works as a RAIS database 
administrator (DBA). The two regulators use RAIS as their database and one is an 
inspector and database administrator while the other an inspector and scientist, 
respectively. The researcher also used literature review to help complete the checklist.  
 
Secondly a structured questionnaire was administered to the database users who work 
at the Directorate Radiation Control. The researcher handed each respondent the 
questionnaire and the written, signed informed consent letter. The researcher explained 
to the respondents that they should answer all questions as honestly as possible and 
that they could ask the researcher for anything unclear about the questions. The 
consent letter also explains about this and the objective of the study. The respondents‟ 
names and other details were not written in the questionnaire for ethical reasons.  
 
The completed questionnaires were collected from the respondents by the researcher 
on the same day and some after one up to three days, to improve the response rate and 
minimise data loss and bias.   
 
3.3.2.1 Data collection instruments  
 
Polit & Beck (2008:417) describe a checklist as a two-dimensional arrangement with a 
series of questions listed along one dimension, usually vertically, and response 
alternatives listed on the other. Checklists include several questions with the same 
response format. They are relatively efficient and easy to understand but usually used in 
self-administered questionnaires (SAQs) rather than interviews.  
 
A structured interview guide is formalised so that all the respondents are presented with 
the same questions in the same order and manner (Brink et al 2006:151). The 
structured questionnaire helped the researcher to collect data within the scope of the 
study and similar types of information from all the respondents. This helped minimise 
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the researcher‟s role and influence of the data collection process and to enable a more 
objective comparison of results. The instrument was tested using similar population 
which was not included in the study. 
 
Both data collection instruments used in this study were constructed using questions to 
address the objectives of the study. The researcher had done a literature review to gain 
some knowledge of the phenomenon of interest in the research. 
 
The checklist was developed by the researcher using the functional requirements of an 
ideal radiation regulatory body‟s database and literature review. The checklist also 
covers the main areas of the radiation regulatory framework as indicated by the IAEA.   
 
3.3.2.2 Characteristics of the data collection instrument  
 
The following are the characteristics of a structured data collection instrument (Babbie 
2007:264-265; Brink et al 2006:151; Polit & Beck 2008:414):  
 
•  The wording used is pre-determined and standardised and the same instrument 
or method is used for all respondents.  
•  The researcher develops the data collection instrument beforehand.  
•  Respondents are asked to answer the same questions in the same order and 
with the same set of response options.  
•  The questions are asked orally in a face-to-face interview.  
•  The interviewer can clarify matters that the respondents do not understand 
clearly thereby obtaining relevant responses.  
•  It is most appropriate when straightforward, factual information is desired.  
•  The interviewer‟s presence decreases the number of “Don‟t knows” and “No 
answers”.  
•  It achieves a higher completion rate.  
•  The researcher is required to have some knowledge of the expected behaviour.  
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In this study, the same interview guide was administered with all the respondents.   
 
3.3.2.3 Ethical considerations related to data collection  
 
Research ethics is doing what is right and good during research; the application of 
general ethical principles to the realm of research. Ethics is a system of moral values 
that is concerned with the degree to which research procedures adhere to professional, 
legal and social obligations to the study respondents. Ethical considerations include the 
right to privacy including refusal to participate in the research, the right to anonymity and 
confidentiality, the right to full disclosure about the research and the right not to be 
harmed in any manner (Burns & Grove 2005:245; Polit & Beck 2008:753).  
 
The researcher submitted his research proposal to the Higher Degrees Committee of 
the Department of Health Studies of Unisa (University of South Africa) for approval. A 
letter requesting permission to conduct a study was sent to the director of the 
Directorate Radiation Control and permission was obtained.   
 
The letter of authorisation to conduct the study was shown to the respondents and they 
were assured that the study will not interfere with their daily routine at their work. 
Respondents were also informed that their participation was voluntary and that they 
were free to withdraw anytime without any punishment. They were also informed that 
the researcher intends to publish the results of the study and that every attempt will be 
made so that the data obtained will not reveal individual characteristics. The 
respondents were also issued with a written, signed informed consent which they 
signed when agreeing to participate in the study (see Annexure E).   
 
No personal or institutional details were presented in the results of the study. The 
researcher maintained confidentiality and anonymity throughout data collection, analysis 
and reporting of the findings.  
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Each questionnaire was accompanied by a written, signed informed consent letter 
requesting consent for participation in the study (see Annexure E). The letter included 
the purpose of the study, the estimated time required to complete the questionnaire, 
and measures to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. The instrument does not contain 
names of the institution or the respondents. Respondents were not required to write any 
personal or institutional details on the questionnaire.  
 
The study maintained a high level of ethical principles which include:  
 
 Beneficence principle (doing good and refraining from doing harm). The study kept 
this principle by not posing any physical or emotional harm to the respondents. 
There were no wilful questions to the respondents. The questionnaire is structured to 
consist of both open- and close-ended questions.  
 Justice principle (fair selection and treatment, privacy, anonymity, confidentiality, 
exploitation). This principle emphasises that the source of data must be protected by 
keeping informants nameless and this is exactly what happens in this study. 
Cameras and recorders were not used to collect data to further ensure 
confidentiality. The researcher always switched off cell phones during questionnaire 
administration to ensure confidentiality and avoid disturbances.     
 Respect for human being principle (autonomy, informed consent, dignity, 
transparency, self determination). This principle requires that the researcher accord 
due respect to study respondents by granting them informed consent before the 
commencement of the study. The respondents were told that they have the right to 
terminate the session or request clarification of any aspect that they do not 
understand. The researcher also explained to the respondents their rights of 
voluntary participation and maintained high standard of informed consent in this 
study.   
 
The researcher declared that he has no competing interests and will respect all the 
respondents‟ rights, including confidentiality of the responses. 
 
73 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Data analysis  
 
Data analysis is the systematic organisation and synthesis of research data and the 
testing of hypothesis through that data. It is conducted to reduce, organise and give 
meaning to data (Burns & Grove 2005:733; Polit & Beck 2008:7510).  
 
Data collected were analysed by a statistician using the Statistical Package for Social 
Studies (SPSS) version 20 in line with the objectives of the study.  
 
 
3.4 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE STUDY  
 
Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to 
measure. It is also the degree to which inferences made in a study are accurate and 
well-founded (Polit & Beck 2008:768). Burns & Grove (2005:42) define validity of an 
instrument as the extent to which the instrument actually reflects the abstract construct 
being examined.  
 
In this study, the internal validity of the research design was confirmed by pre-testing 
the research instrument. The results of this study should be a true reflection of the 
respondents‟ knowledge and perceptions of the database system as the regulatory 
body‟s information management tool, and not attributable to extraneous factors. In 
addition, the researcher‟s supervisor reviewed the structured interview schedule to 
check for logical flow of the questions.   
 
Brink et al (2006:119) says that external validity refers to the extent to which the findings 
of a study can be generalised to similar settings.  According to Burns & Grove 
(2005:736), external validity is concerned with the extent to which study findings can be 
generalised beyond the sample that is used in a study. External validity may be 
influenced, for instance by the Hawthorne effect. The Hawthorne effect occurs when the 
respondents, because they are aware that they are involved in a study, behave in a 
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certain way or give responses they believe to be socially acceptable but which are not 
their true experiences (Brink et al 2006:101).  
 
In order to minimise the Hawthorne effect and thus improve external validity in this 
study, the researcher explained the study to the respondents and assured them of 
confidentiality and protection of their identities as their names were not required on the 
instrument. The respondents were requested to give honest responses and were 
informed that their responses would not affect them in any way as they were given 
anonymously (Brink et al 2006:101).      
 
In most of the questions in the questionnaire, the respondents were requested to 
explain their response. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter covers the research design and methodology, including the population, 
sampling, data collection and analysis, ethical considerations, and internal and external 
validity of the study.  
 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the analysis, presentation and description of research findings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION 
OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology. This chapter discusses the data 
analysis and the presentation and description of the research findings. The researcher 
used a non-experimental, quantitative, comparative and descriptive research design to 
systematically gather information from the literature and users of the Radiation Control 
and RAIS database systems.  
 
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the current database 
system used by the Radiation Control. 
 
The objectives of the study were to:  
 
 Compare the capabilities of the current database system used by Radiation 
Control with RAIS.  
 
The checklist (refer to annexure D) was used for this purpose. The researcher 
answered the checklist with the assistance of the literature review and the expert views. 
The Radiation Control database‟s database administrator (DBA) answered the checklist 
questions on behalf of the Radiation Control database. The RAIS part of the checklist 
questions was answered by two regulators from Namibia and Ethiopia, who have the 
working experience with RAIS. The Ethiopian colleague is also a RAIS DBA at the 
Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority. The respondents (Radiation Control 
employees) did not participate in answering the checklist as they do not have the 
experience of working with RAIS. A RAIS DBA from the IAEA was also consulted by the 
researcher to help answer the checklist part of RAIS.  
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Since this checklist was only completed once (see sections 3.3.2 & 3.3.2.1), no 
statistical analysis of the data are presented. The responses are tabulated below (see 
table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 Checklist Results  
 
Criteria Sub-criteria RC 
Database 
RAIS 
1. National regulatory 
infrastructure information 
Regulatory infrastructure information:  
Legislation information No Yes 
Regulations information No Yes 
Codes of Practice & Guidelines No Yes 
Regulator‟s responsibilities & functions No Yes 
Authority, power & resources provisions No Yes 
Division of responsibilities information:  
Authority‟s liaison & working procedures No Yes 
MoU No Yes 
International co-operation information No Yes 
2. Facilities & departments Licensee information Yes Yes 
Radiation users‟ information Yes Yes 
RP / A/RPO information Yes Yes 
User & Legal Person  No Yes 
3. Radiation sources and 
associated equipment 
Radiation sources details & information Yes Yes 
National inventory register Yes Yes 
ICSRS link No Yes 
4. Authorisation Authorisation information No Yes 
Licensing information  No Yes 
Exemption & exclusions  No Yes 
5. Inspection Role & implementation procedure No Yes 
Inspectors‟ powers No Yes 
Inspector-legal person relation information  No Yes 
Inspection regulatory requirements 
information 
No Yes 
6. Enforcement Graded enforcement action information No Yes 
Enforcement action implications information No Yes 
Enforcement action interaction No  Yes 
7. Remote Access Online submission of applications No Yes 
Inspectors‟ database remote access No Yes 
Licensees‟ database remote access No Yes 
Public access for information distribution No Yes 
8. Customisation Customisable to regulator‟s specific needs Yes Yes 
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(mechanisms) Multilingual No Yes 
Upward compatibility  Yes Yes 
9. Radiation incidences Emergency response plan No Yes 
Dose limits information No Yes 
Dosimetry service  No Yes 
Relevant bodies‟ link No Yes 
10. Technical services QA information Yes Yes 
Technical services link No Yes 
Inspection Bodies information Yes No 
Leak tests procedures  Yes Yes 
Services & repairs information No Yes 
11. Workers Workers qualifications & responsibilities No Yes 
Workers‟ rights & limitations No Yes 
Verification & validation No Yes 
Fundamental requirements information No Yes 
12. Data integrity Data validation Yes Yes 
Consistency & validation check Yes Yes 
13. Database model Relational model Yes Yes 
14. Security  Access control Yes Yes 
Individual & group privileges  Yes Yes 
15. Automated 
optimization 
Frequent usage improved speed Yes Yes 
Performance monitoring tools Yes Yes 
Total items marked “yes” 17 51 
Total (Percentage)  33% 98% 
  
The total number of “yes” responses between the two database systems was compared 
descriptively. Radiation Control database received 33% (17) “yes” responses while 
RAIS received 98% (51), indicating that the RAIS database supports more of the 
required functions than the Radiation Control database. 
 
It is possible that the sub-criteria: “Inspection Bodies information” is available under “QA 
information” in RAIS.    
 
 Evaluate implementation experiences of the South African database system 
against the structural and functional features of the system.  
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For this objective, questionnaire (refer to annexure F) data were used. Responses to 
individual questions were analysed by a statistician. The researcher also cross-
validated the responses against the systems‟ functional structure and model.  
 
   
4.2 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
 
Data were collected in two phases using a criteria checklist and a questionnaire. Firstly, 
the researcher answered the criteria checklist which compares the two database 
systems using information obtained from the literature review and four expert views. 
Secondly, the questionnaire was administered to thirty-five (35) users of the Radiation 
Control database. Thirty-one (31) respondents returned completed questionnaires.  
 
A statistician analysed the data using the IBM SPSS version 20.0 computer program. 
Descriptive analysis was used since both objectives were purely descriptive. The 
categorical data were analysed, interpreted, and presented using frequency tables, 
percentages, and bar or pie charts as appropriate.  
 
The researcher also cross-validated the respondents‟ answers with the actual structure 
and function differences between the Radiation Control and RAIS databases.  
 
 
4.3 RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
4.3.1 Sample characteristics  
 
The respondents of this study were employees and users of the Department of Health: 
Directorate Radiation Control‟s database system. All the respondents have at least 
matriculation as their basic educational level.  
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 Administration officer: The number of administration officers that participated in 
the study was 8. Of these, 2 officers have read-only access to view and request 
some information from the database. The other 6 users have the same but also are 
able to enter data into the database.  
 
 Inspector: The database is central to the inspectors‟ course of doing their work. 
They use it, among other things, to mainly plan their inspections, perform follow-ups, 
respond to queries from licensees, and monitor the progress made in their work. The 
inspectors however are only allowed access to view data retrieved from the 
database. The inspector database users mainly consist of officers of radiography 
background. There is one inspector who is of a scientist background with a B. Sc 
degree in nuclear physics.     
 
 Scientist: The scientist users of the database have full access to the input menu 
which allows them to view, modify, add, and delete all regulatory data but only for 
the isotopes sub-directorate. These users are mainly of a medical physicist 
background.  
 
 Manager: The management users of the database are composed of a director, four 
deputy directors, and two assistant directors. They have full access to the input 
menu which allows them to view, modify, add, and delete all regulatory data. The 
director has full access to the database. Among this user group is a deputy director 
who joined Radiation Control in 2010, is of medical physicist background, an IAEA 
liaison officer, and an admirer of RAIS.    
 
 Information management officer: This user has full access to the database 
including adding, modifying, deleting, and viewing all data, modifying regulatory 
system model, and modifying regulatory system data. The user works as a database 
administrator but is employed by the department as an administration officer.           
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4.3.1.1 Respondents’ Position at Radiation Control  
 
All the respondents (100%; N = 31) answered this question item. See figure 4.1 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Respondents’ Position at Radiation Control  
 
The result showed that most of the database users at Radiation Control are inspectors, 
administration officers, or managers. See section 4.3.1 above regarding the details of 
the users‟ access/use of the database.    
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4.3.1.2 Use of database per week  
 
The respondents were asked to indicate the number of times each used the database in 
a week. See figure 4.2 below. 
 
    
Figure 4.2 Respondents’ use of database per week 
 
The findings indicated that most of the respondents use the database more than 50 
times in a week. The findings also revealed that the majority (68%) of the respondents 
use the database for 25 times or more per week.     
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4.3.1.3 Remote Access Importance  
 
For this item respondents were asked whether they thought it was important for the 
database to be remotely accessible. Of the respondents, 71% (n = 22) thought it was 
important while 29% (n = 9) did not think so.   
 
The majority of the respondents expressed their wish for the database to be remotely 
accessible, especially for inspectors while they are out on duty performing inspections. 
If the database was remotely accessible, most respondents felt that inspectors would be 
able to obtain information updates and issue reports while on site.  Others said it would 
help officers in regional offices to meet deadlines, issue reports in time and with online 
applications submission.   
 
4.3.1.4 Missing Data  
 
The respondents were asked if they miss any data in the database that they would like 
to see added. There were 38.7% (n = 12) respondents that said they miss data in the 
database, and 61.3% (n = 19) said they did not miss any data.  
    
Although the majority of respondents are satisfied with the data in the database, about 
40% of the respondents believe that additional data would be helpful and were able to 
describe these data elements, mainly being descriptive data of licensees and radiation 
sources. Users‟ data needs also depend on their user profile and the type of information 
they require from the database.   
 
This result shows that while most users may be able to get all the information they need 
from the database, there are those that require more but are unable to get it. It is to be 
expected that users such as inspectors, whose use of the database is more extensive 
and central to their work, may need more data which they‟re unable to get. It is this 
group of users too that collects more data to be entered into the database to either 
update, correct, or create new information.   
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4.3.1.5 Inconsistent/ambiguous data  
 
Respondents were asked if they ever encountered inconsistent / ambiguous data after 
sending queries to the database. Of the respondents, 71% (n = 22) said they did and 
29% (n = 9) said that they did not encounter inconsistent data from the database.  
 
The respondents explained their “yes” response by either citing human error as the 
cause for inconsistent data, or listing examples of such data like incorrect serial 
numbers and premises addresses. Others mentioned non-updated data and 
„inaccuracies due to collapse & poor management over many years‟.   
 
It is worth mentioning that these errors may be due to human error in entering and 
maintaining data, not as a result of the database structural problems. 
 
4.3.1.6 Features that could be added to the database  
 
The respondents were asked whether there are features that they would like to see 
added to the database. There were 41.9% (n = 13) respondents that said there are 
features, and 58.1% (n = 18) that said there are no features they would like to see 
added to the database. 
 
Most respondents that answered “yes” listed remote/online access, more alert features, 
and security details.  
 
4.3.1.7 Should the database be customisable?  
 
The question was whether it is important for the database to be customisable to users‟ 
specific needs? Of the respondents, 80.6% (n = 25) believed it is important, and 19.4% 
(n = 6) felt it is not important that the database be customisable. 
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A customisable database enables a regulatory body to match it with national needs 
which may include language, national legislative frameworks, administrative structures, 
and institutional and regulatory frameworks.    
 
4.3.2 Database resources   
 
The second section of the questionnaire focused on the database resources and its 
importance.  
 
4.3.2.1 Database human resources  
 
The respondents were asked about the available human resources devoted to the 
database matters at Radiation Control. See table 4.2 below.  
 
Table 4.2 Human resources devoted to database matters  
 
Database Human Resources 
Respondents responses Count Column N % 
Database Administrator 28 90.3% 
Information Resource Manager / Data Administrator 2 6.5% 
Other, Sen. Admin Officer, Assist. Dir. & Dep. Dir. currently used 
on database. 
1 3.2% 
Total 31 100.0% 
 
The respondents who answered with „Other‟ to this question, explained that Radiation 
Control currently has an Administration Officer, Assistant Director and a Deputy Director 
working with the database. The three officials are not trained to administrate / work with 
the database.  
 
 
 
85 
 
 
 
It is important to note that the designated DBA is employed as an administration officer 
but has been working over the years as an „in-house information technology (IT) expert‟, 
which includes working as the DBA. That means that there is no qualified database 
administrator or any other IT official manning the Radiation Control database.    
 
4.3.2.2 Importance of the database’s link with other relevant information   
            Resources  
 
This item sought the respondents‟ opinion on the database‟s linkage with other relevant 
authorities‟ information resources, such as the IAEA, ICSRS, NNR, NECSA, etc. Of the 
respondents, 58.1% (n = 18) thought it is important, and 41.9% (n = 13) thought it is not 
important for the database to be linked to other authorities‟ information resources. 
 
The respondents listed different reasons and features that would be useful were the 
database to be linked to other relevant authorities‟ information resources (see Table 
4.3).  
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Table 4.3 Reasons why respondents felt it was important for the database to 
be linked to other relevant information resources  
 
Respondents’ views Count Column N % 
N/A 18 58.1% 
e.g. Customs - Imports/Exports 1 3.2% 
e.g. IAEA 1 3.2% 
e.g. NNR (NORM Material, Mining), Industrial Radiography, NECSA. 1 3.2% 
Esp. NNR for incidences reporting 1 3.2% 
For regulatory bodies' co-operation without relying on verbal 
communication. 
1 3.2% 
guidance & rules on some source issues 1 3.2% 
Health & Safety 1 3.2% 
HPCSA, Med Aid Scheme, etc 1 3.2% 
Professional registration confirmation 1 3.2% 
Read only options should be available to an individual licensee/supplier 1 3.2% 
SARS, Customs, SAPS, SABS / Dosimetry 1 3.2% 
They should be able to check for licence/authority info when queries 
arise. 
1 3.2% 
To combat  fraud 1 3.2% 
Total 31 100.0% 
 
 
It is important to note that it is managers, inspectors, and scientist user groups that 
usually attend seminars, workshops and training conferences which may involve 
interacting with other authorities‟ colleagues. The other 42% users that this result shows 
may be influenced by this fact and their user profile in their thinking.   
 
4.3.2.3 Consolidated data  
 
The respondents were asked whether the database is able to give them consolidated 
data such as the national inventory of radiation sources. Those who answered with a 
„No‟ were asked to explain their answer. Of the respondents, 54.8% (n = 17) said the 
database is not able, and 45.2% (n = 14) said it is able to give consolidated data. 
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The respondents, including those that answered „Yes‟, mentioned that the data, e.g.  
the number of radiation sources in South Africa, issued by the database is inaccurate. 
As it is a fact that there is no reliable national sources inventory register in South Africa, 
the 45% respondents either did not understand the question or consider consolidated 
data to be something else other than, for example, the sources inventory. It may be that 
according to what those users need from the database whenever they use it, they do 
obtain all the data (consolidated data) from it.    
 
The administration and manager user groups constitute about 48% and the inspector, 
scientist, and DBA user groups constitute about 52% of the respondents. The reason for 
almost even views of opinion on this question may lie in this information.  
 
4.3.2.4 Regulatory authority’s organisational structure  
 
The question to the respondents was whether the organisational structure of the South 
African regulatory infrastructure is clearly outlined in the database. See figure 4.3 below.  
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Figure 4.3 The SA regulatory authority’s organisational structure outline in the  
                     Database 
 
Most of the respondents who answered „No‟ stated that the information is either not 
clearly defined or available on the organisational structure. Some felt that information on 
the organisational structure belongs to the website and not the database.  
 
The result shows that the regulatory body‟s organisational structure needs to be 
improved whether on the database or the website. The regulator‟s website used to be 
lined to that of the National Department of Health but since about three years ago, this 
is no longer the case. As a result there is now a standalone website 
(https://sites.google.com/site/radiationcontroldoh/) which employees and the licensees 
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alike constantly complain that it‟s difficult to access. The main department‟s website 
(http://www.doh.gov.za/), revamped in 2011, also has some old Radiation Control 
documents and forms which are never updated.    
 
4.3.2.5 National and international bi- or multilateral agreements and MoU  
             Information  
 
The respondents were asked to indicate whether the database has information about 
memoranda of understanding and bilateral or multilateral agreements with other 
national or international bodies. Of the respondents, 80.6% (n = 25) said the database 
has no such information; 6.5% (n = 2) said it does; and 12.9% (n = 4) said that they 
„don‟t know‟ whether or not the database has such information. 
 
The respondents who answered “Yes” could have misunderstood the question or did 
not know what is meant by the memorandum of understanding or bilateral/multinational 
agreements.  
      
For the record, the Radiation Control database and the website do not contain any 
details of the MoUs or agreements with other national or international bodies. 
 
4.3.2.6 Facilities and departments information to facilitate sources’ tracking  
 
The respondents were asked whether the database contains enough information about 
licensees to facilitate tracking of lost or stolen radiation sources. Of the respondents, 
41.9% n = 13) agreed that it does; and 58.1% (n = 18) said that it does not have enough 
information.  
 
Among the data the respondents mentioned as missing in the database for this purpose 
were premises addresses, contact details, and serial numbers. This information 
sometimes would be available but outdated or inaccurate.  
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The above-mentioned details depend on the data entered into the database and how 
often the database is updated to be accurate and complete. Therefore the database 
cannot be blamed for this as it is down to human error. It would help the situation if the 
database allowed controlled access to the licensees and inspectors, for instance, 
according to their user information needs. The annual reports issuing of the database 
also needs to be improved.  
 
4.3.2.7 Radiation Sources details to facilitate tracking  
 
This item asked the respondents whether the database has enough radiation sources 
details to facilitate tracking of lost or missing sources. Of the respondents, 35.5% (n=11) 
believed that it does; while 65.4% (n = 20) said it does not contain enough information. 
 
The information that is useful in tracking a radiation source include the source details 
such as the serial numbers (container and source), make/type, activity of the source, 
date of calibration, etc. It is important that this information be complete and accurate in 
the database. This result and the one above (4.3.2.7) show that the database‟s data 
consistency checking to reduce human errors needs to be improved.   
 
4.3.2.8 Authorisation, inspection, and enforcement processes details  
 
The respondents were asked whether authorisation, inspection, and enforcement 
processes were clearly outlined and explained in the database. Of the respondents, 
19.4% (n = 6) responded “Yes”; while 80.6% (n = 25) responded “No”.  
 
Some of the respondents felt that these are not supposed to be on or functions of the 
database. However some also felt that it would be helpful and informative if these were 
available and explained in the database provided the database was accessible to the 
licensees. The responses for 19% of the respondents that answered “Yes” may be 
explained to misunderstanding the question, as there is no information on these 
processes in the database.  
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4.3.2.9 Online submissions and monitoring of applications  
 
The respondents were asked whether the database allowed online submission and 
monitoring of authorisation applications. See figure 4.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Online submissions and monitoring of applications  
 
Online submission of applications and subsequent monitoring of its progress would help 
facilitate the smooth and prompt authorisation process. It would also provide for the 
basis of an accurate and complete data in the application forms and thus the database.   
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4.3.2.10 Graded enforcement action process  
 
The respondents were asked whether the process of graded enforcement action for 
non-compliance is explained in the database. See figure 4.5 below.     
 
 
Figure 4.5 Graded enforcement action process in the database  
 
Graded enforcement refers to corrective action or sanction according to the level of no-
compliance. It is important that this process‟ information be clearly outlined and 
available to the licensees.  
 
There are codes of practice documents available to the licensees on this process but 
they are found on the website.   
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4.3.3 Database Scope  
 
This section discusses the findings and perceptions of the respondents with regard to 
the scope of the database.  
 
4.3.3.1 Regulatory processes and the database integration  
 
The respondents were asked whether they thought the database was integrated within 
the regulatory processes such as the licensing, inspection and follow-up. Of the 
respondents, 41.9% (n = 13) thought that the database is integrated within the 
regulatory processes, while 58.1% (n = 18) thought it was not integrated.   
 
The database which is integrated within the regulatory process, ideally, would be a 
comprehensive system which covers all the main areas of the regulatory framework 
(authorisation, inspection, enforcement, and so on); be remotely accessible; and 
provides a means for information dissemination. The current Radiation Control 
database does not offer any these services. This result however shows that about 42% 
of the respondents think that it is integrated. This may be down to their interpretation of 
the situation or what their work requires of the database.    
 
4.3.3.2 Importance of data consistency checking  
 
The respondents were asked about their views on the importance of the database 
providing data consistency checking to reduce human errors. See figure 4.6 below.    
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Figure 4.6 Importance of data consistency checking  
 
Although the database has the data consistency checks feature, it is not clear whether it 
is efficiently set up to be used. Data consistency ensures, for instance, that each user 
observes a consistent data view that is validated, accurate and usable. This includes 
visible changes made by the user‟s own transactions (Oracle 2005; Rob & Coronel 
2007:222 – 229).     
 
4.3.3.3 Protection of vital data  
 
The respondents were asked about the importance of the database‟s ability to protect 
vital data against unintentional modification or deletion. See figure 4.7 below.  
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Figure 4.7 Protection of vital data  
 
This is one of the very important specifications of a database and the respondents‟ 
response to this question (and other questions in section 4.3.3) is indicative of their 
understanding of the database‟s functional requirements.  
 
4.3.3.4 Database access control  
 
The respondents were asked how important it is for the database to have access control 
to protect data against unauthorised access and to ensure confidentiality. Of the 
respondents, 90.3% (n = 28) thought that access control is very important; 3.2% (n = 1) 
thought that it is important; and 6.5% (n = 2) thought that it is necessary. 
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4.3.3.5 Database as means for information dissemination  
 
The respondents were asked if they thought it is important for the database to be 
available for use as means for information dissemination to the public, customised 
according to the regulatory body‟s policy. See figure 4.8 below.  
 
     
Figure 4.8 Database as means for information dissemination  
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4.3.3.6 Interface for catalogues on sources and equipment manufacturers 
and models  
 
The respondents were asked for their views on how important it is for the database to 
provide for an interface for catalogues on manufacturers and models of sealed sources, 
radiation generators and associated equipment. See figure 4.9 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 Interface for catalogues on sources and equipment manufacturers                           
           and models 
 
This result might be reflective of the different views held by respondents from different 
sub-directorates according to their use of the database. The NIRMED and Ionising 
Radiation sub-directorates use catalogues a lot, especially in med-sales and 
98 
 
 
 
imports/exports sections.  On the other hand, the Licensing & Inspections and Isotopes 
sub-directorates do not use this part as often.  
 
4.3.3.7 Online submission of data by facilities  
 
The respondents were asked if they thought online submission of data by the facilities 
(applicant licensees), subject to validation by the regulatory body, was important. See 
figure 4.10 below.   
 
 
Figure 4.10 Online submissions of data by facilities  
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The Radiation Control database does not have the feature to allow any online 
submissions. The database is not remotely accessible to either the workers of the 
regulatory body or the public.  
 
4.3.4 General database information  
 
4.3.4.1 Uncaptured relevant information  
 
The question to the respondents was whether there is any relevant information that is 
not captured by the database. See table 4.4 below.  
 
Table 4.4 Database uncaptured relevant data  
 
Uncaptured Relevant Info 
Respondents’ answers Count Column N % 
No 16 51.6% 
Yes 6 19.4% 
Yes, certain info from application form 1 3.2% 
Yes, creation of new holder 1 3.2% 
Yes, inspector's test info & results 1 3.2% 
Yes, not related to database. 1 3.2% 
Yes, previous non-compliance; previous holders 1 3.2% 
Yes, QA results; outstanding inspection requirements 1 3.2% 
Yes, refer to previous questions 1 3.2% 
Yes, reports, follow-up findings, court cases, etc 1 3.2% 
Yes, some info not captured for a long time 1 3.2% 
Total 31 100.0% 
 
The respondents were supposed to explain their answer if it was a „yes‟, that there is 
uncaptured relevant data in the database. However some, 19.4% (n = 6), of them did 
not explain but just answered with a „yes‟ response. Some respondents, 29% (n = 9), 
gave some form of explanation or examples of the relevant data they were missing in 
the database, as seen in the above table 4.3. All the examples of uncaptured data as 
provided by the respondents are listed on the above table.   
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4.3.4.2 Limited database access for inspectors  
 
What this question sought to find from the respondents was whether they thought 
inspectors should be allowed limited access to make changes or updates to the 
database. Of the respondents, 51.6% (n = 16) thought that inspectors should be allowed 
limited access to the database to make changes; and 45.2% (n = 14) thought that they 
should not be allowed limited editing access.   
 
Although the question did not require any explanation of the respondents, one who 
answered with a „yes‟ said that this should be subject to approval.  
 
The inspectors currently do not have any rights to enter or update any data in the 
database. They have to submit handwritten information/data to the person(s) who then 
enter it to the database. 
 
4.3.4.3 Specific database access for licensees  
 
The respondents were asked whether they thought the licensees or their official 
representatives should be allowed access to their facilities or departments‟ information. 
Of the respondents, 54.8% (n = 17) thought that this should be allowed; and 38.7% (n = 
12) thought that it should not be allowed.  
 
Of the respondents that answered that specific access should be allowed to licensees, 
two more said that it must be limited and read-only access, respectively.   
 
Currently there is no role-based update access to the database at Radiation Control. 
The DBA, the director, the deputy directors, the scientists, and six administration 
officers currently have some sort of controlled access to the database (see section 4.3.1 
above).  
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4.3.4.4 Division of Radiation Control database  
 
Of the respondents, 77.4% (n = 24) indicated that they have no problem with the 
division of the database into x-rays and isotopes databases; and 22.6% (n = 7) 
indicated that they have a problem with this.  
 
One of the respondents who answered „yes‟ to the division of the database, commented 
that since there are different regulations and conditions for x-rays and isotopes, there 
should also be different databases.  
 
The x-rays and isotopes databases are not linked to each other. There are licensees, 
for instance, who have both x-rays and isotopes radiation sources. With the two 
separate databases that do not even „talk‟ to each other, it sometimes interferes with 
their regulatory control and the regulatory processes such as authorisation, inspection 
and enforcement.  
 
There are also other small databases at head office (other than the x-rays and isotopes) 
such as the Industrial Radiography Med-Sales databases.  While these database 
systems are mainly used at head office, there are occasions when other officers at 
regional offices need to access it for their work purposes.  
 
This result therefore shows that while it might be necessary to split the database, there 
should be one overall main database for the regulatory body which allows controlled 
access to the officials according to their work needs.   
 
4.3.4.5 Other information resources database access  
 
The respondents were asked if there are other national or international radiation 
information resources accessible through the database. Of the respondents, 6.5% (n = 
2) said that there are other database accessible information resources; 77.4% (n = 24) 
said that there none; 16.1% (n = 5) said that they don‟t know. 
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One of the respondents who said that there are no information resources accessible 
through the database added that there should be such resources. 
 
There are currently no other radiation information resources accessible through the 
database. The internet is the only tool officers can use to access these resources.  
 
4.3.4.6 Access to other needed information resources  
 
This item asked the respondents to indicate if they have access to other information 
resources they may need at their work. Of the respondents, 58.1% (n = 18) agreed that 
they do have access to other information resources they need; and 41.9% (n = 13) said 
that they do not have access.   
 
In the course of doing their work, Radiation Control workers may need information 
which is not available on the database or the website. This relevant information includes 
Customs, radiation waste management services, International Nuclear & Radiological 
Event Scale (INES), environmental health services, and so on. It is important that they 
be able to access this information. They can currently only access this information 
through the internet.  
 
4.3.4.7 Source categorisation information  
 
The respondents were asked whether the database has enough information about the 
categorisation and their associated risk. Of the respondents, 19.4% (n = 4) said that the 
database has enough information on source categorisation; 64.5% (n = 20) said that it 
does not; and 16.1% (n = 5) said that they do not know if it has such information. There 
is no information on radiation sources categorisation on the database.  
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4.3.4.8 Database essential technical services information  
 
The item required the respondents to indicate which of the listed essential technical 
services, if there were any, their information was available on the database. See figure 
4.11.  
 
 
Figure 4.11 Database essential technical services information  
 
The result shows that most respondents said that there is no information on the 
database about the essential technical services. However there are those that said that 
they can find information for some of the services. This may be as a result of the 
respondents confusing the licensees such as SABS, NECSA, Process Automation, and 
others. While these institutions do offer the essential technical services listed in the 
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question, they are on the database purely as licensees. One has to know that SABS, for 
example, offers dosimetry services but there is nothing on the database to this effect.   
 
The current state of the data management at Radiation Control leads to a situation of 
uncertainty and missing information in the regulatory control programme. There is no 
consistent and common approach towards, for instance, the ways in which the 
databases‟ systems are updated with data. This leads to data inconsistency and poor 
data integration in both systems.   
 
When information regarding facilities or licensees is received either by inspectors in the 
field or telephonically, it is handed over in writing to the databases administration 
personnel. However discrepancies between the information in the databases and that 
applicable to the licensees/facilities details arise regularly. There are always 
inaccuracies and anomalies with regards to data such as serial numbers or contact 
details, in the database.         
 
The databases are web based but they do not allow remote access to the regulatory 
authority staff, such as inspectors in the field. The databases also do not provide for 
electronic submission of information such as applications or annual returns from 
licensees. 
 
 
4.4 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
The research findings have shown how the two database systems (Radiation Control 
database and RAIS) compare with each other. It has also highlighted the strengths and 
the shortcomings of the Radiation Control database.    
 
The comparative functionality checklist and results of four experienced experts revealed 
that RAIS supports more functions than the Radiation control database in terms of the 
main areas of the radiation regulatory framework. The Radiation Control database 
105 
 
 
 
scored 33% (17) “Yes” responses to RAIS‟ 98% (51) “Yes” responses to questions of 
the supported functionality in the checklist. These results showed that RAIS is likely to 
be a more suitable database system for a radiation regulatory authority (see section 4.1 
& Table 4.1). 
 
It was however noted the sub-criteria: “Inspection Body information” might be covered 
under “QA information” in RAIS.    
 
In the second phase of the study results analysis, the strengths and shortcomings of the 
Radiation Control database were highlighted. The functional requirements and models 
of both database systems including the ideal Radiation Control database system (see 
sections 2.2 to 2.4.7) were used to cross-validate the respondents‟ answers. It was also 
noted that the Radiation Control database has some data type problems, such as 
having primary keys as VARCHARs, which can be a major contributor to data error.    
 
In figure 2.1 (page 28 above), for instance, „Holder.Condits‟ is of type VARCHAR250) 
and is related to „Condits.Condition‟ which is of type VARCHAR2(2). This appears to be 
a type definition error with a potential to create database consistency checking error. In 
figure 2.2 (page 29 above), for an example, „Holder.AUDIT_INSP‟ is shown to be 
related to „Condits.Conno‟ and „Holder.Condit‟ to „Inspectors.Insp_Code‟. This may 
explain the corruption of data in the database.  
 
 The results showed that the users would prefer that the database offer remote 
accessibility. The results also revealed that most of the data or information available in 
the database is sufficient for most of the users to perform their duties. However the 
users also complained about the inaccuracies and lack of regular updates of the 
database. This could be as a result of the lack of qualified personnel devoted to 
supporting and maintaining the database as well as problems with data input.   
 
The study results also showed that there are many improvements that could be done to 
the Radiation Control database and its contents. The database is not able to produce 
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reliable and consolidated information such as the national register of radiation sources. 
The improvements also include customisation to match national needs, consistency 
data checking, and issuing of reports. The database already has these capabilities but 
is not optimally used. The respondents thought that it would be beneficial if the 
database was able to link up with other authorities‟ information resources such as the 
NNR, NECSA, IAEA, or ICSRS.     
 
The results indicated that some database users do not have confidence in the quality 
and type of information in the database such as the details of the radiation sources and 
facilities and departments. The results also showed that this depends on the user 
profile, accessibility status, and the level of knowledge each user possess. Since 
radiation control is the primary function of the Directorate Radiation Control, it is a 
concern that the database seem not to have enough good information to aid tracking of 
radiation sources. The processes of authorisation/licensing, inspection and enforcement 
are also not available, clearly outlined and explained in the database.  
 
The respondents view the database as not integrated within the regulatory process 
which is very critical as this should be the main function of the database. The radiation 
regulatory authority‟s database ideally should comprehensively cover all the main areas 
of the regulatory framework (authorisation, inspection, enforcement, and so on.  
  
The administration and manager user groups constitute about 48% and the inspector, 
scientist, and DBA user groups constitute about 52% of the respondents. This could 
have led to the  almost even split between those respondents who said they can get 
consolidated data and those who answered that the database does not give them 
consolidated information. The organisational structure of the Radiation Control is not 
clearly outlined in the database, according to the results. Some respondents thought 
that while this is important, it should be in the website as opposed to the database.    
 
The results also showed that the respondents support the splitting of the database. 
However the one main database for the regulatory body which has controlled access is 
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necessary for all the officials to do their work. The study results showed that there is no 
essential technical services information on the database. However some respondents 
mistook the licensee details such as those of SABS and NECSA on the database as 
meaning that the database has information on these and others as technical services.   
  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the data analysis, presentation and interpretation of the 
research findings. The results were presented in tables, graphs, and figures.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes the study, briefly discusses its limitations, and makes 
recommendations for practice and further research.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this chapter, the following aspects are discussed: research design and method; 
summary and interpretation of the research findings; and conclusions. The 
recommendations; contributions and limitations of the study; and concluding remarks 
are also presented and discussed.  
 
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD  
 
A quantitative research design was used in this study since it is appropriate to explore 
the database system and examine its effectiveness as a data management tool of the 
radiation regulatory body. A criteria checklist and questionnaires were used to collect 
data in order to analyse and compare the database systems with the view of 
highlighting the strengths or shortcomings of the Radiation Control database.  
 
The study population consisted of all the employees of Radiation Control who use the 
database in their course of work. The researcher administered the questionnaire and 
was available to clear up any queries. This helped with the response rate as the sample 
size (31) was small. The respondents however answered the questionnaire on their 
own.   
 
Data were collected using the checklist and the questionnaire. The researcher 
answered the checklist using the literature review and the expert views of three 
colleagues with working experience of RAIS and the Radiation Control database. The 
database administrator at Radiation Control answered for the Radiation Control 
database. On the RAIS side, a colleague from Namibia and Ethiopia, both RAIS with 
working experience, answered the checklist. The researcher also approached the RAIS 
DBA at the IAEA to assist in this regard. This was done to minimise bias. The 
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questionnaires were administered to complete the second phase of data collection (see 
chapter 3). The researcher developed the functional requirements and model of the 
database systems to be used to cross-validate the respondents‟ answers from the 
questionnaire.  
  
A pre-test of the questionnaire was done at NNR with the users of the database who 
work there. This was done to ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument 
(questionnaire). It was as a result of this exercise that a “None” option was added to 
question 4.8 of the questionnaire (see annexure F).  
 
The researcher adhered to a strict ethical code of conduct by obtaining a written 
permission from the Radiation Control Director to conduct the study there. The 
researcher also sought each respondent‟s consent through a written signed informed 
consent letter which accompanied each questionnaire (see annexure C and annexure 
E).  
 
Confidentiality was maintained in the study from the construction of the questionnaire to 
the data collection process itself. The respondents were not required to write their 
names in the questionnaire and no recording was done during the questionnaire 
completion process. The researcher always respected the respondents‟ privacy and 
rights.  
 
 
5.3 SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
The study results have shown that RAIS is likely to be more effective than the Radiation 
Control database as a radiation regulatory authority‟s data management tool. RAIS 
performed better than the Radiation Control database when the two systems were 
compared about the main areas of the regulatory framework (refer to table 4.1). RAIS 
promotes a consistent and common approach to the regulatory control of radiation 
sources; is flexible to respond to specific national needs; and pays due account to 
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legislative framework, administrative structure, and institutional and regulatory 
framework (RAIS 2012).       
 
The study findings also highlighted the users‟ needs for a database with high quality 
accurate and reliable consolidated information that can be accessed from multiple 
points without compromising security and confidentiality. The results showed that the 
database is unable to produce consolidated data such as the national inventory of 
radiation sources. A well designed database facilitates data management and 
generates accurate and valuable information (Rob & Coronel 2007:9).  
 
The respondents indicated in the study results that the South African radiation 
regulatory authority structure is not clearly outlined in the database. The database also 
lacks information capability to aid tracking of lost or missing radiation sources due to its 
poor information and details of licensees and sources. The results also showed that, 
while human error might plays a role, there are some structural problems with the 
Radiation Control database. A poorly designed database is likely to become a breeding 
ground for difficult-to-trace errors that may lead to bad decision making. Bad decision 
making can lead to the downfall of an organisation (Rob & Coronel 2007:9).  
 
The Radiation Control database appears not to be integrated within the regulatory 
processes of licensing, inspection and enforcement, according to the study results. It is 
also not remotely accessible by the regulatory body officials or the licensees. Therefore 
it cannot be used as a means for information dissemination to the public. RAIS provides 
a means for information dissemination to the public which (the public area) the 
regulatory body can customise to its policy (RAIS 2012). This also means that the 
database cannot be accessed by inspectors on the field when they need it. A good 
database is the one that meets all user requirements (Rob & Coronel 2007: 131).  
     
The study results indicate that the users would like a dynamic database that is remotely 
accessible, customisable and has upward compatibility features. The results of this 
study showed that the Radiation Control database does not allow remote accessibility 
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and does not have enough information about essential technical services. RAIS 
provides, through it customisation feature, for expanding of its scope to cover other 
areas (beside the regulatory framework main areas), if of interest to the regulatory 
authority (RAIS 2012). 
 
The study findings distinguish between issues related to inherent database structural / 
functional problems and those that could be related to data quality. The findings also 
revealed that with better staff training and complement; and database maintenance, the 
Radiation Control database would be effective for the regulatory authority‟s information 
management needs.           
 
5.3.1 Objective 1: To compare the capabilities of the current database system  
          used by Radiation Control with RAIS.  
 
The findings of this study revealed that RAIS performs better than the Radiation Control 
database in the main areas of the regulatory framework. The Radiation Control 
database received 17 yes responses (33%) while RAIS received 51 yes responses 
(98%) during the first phase of data collection. Based on these findings, the researcher 
concludes that RAIS is more suitable as a radiation regulatory authority database 
system than the Radiation Control database. Therefore the first objective of this study 
has been achieved (refer to section 4.1 and Table 4.1).  
 
 5.3.2 Objective 2: To evaluate implementation experiences of the South  
African database system against the structural and functional  
features of the system.  
 
The study respondents revealed that they would like a relational database that is 
remotely accessible, gives them high quality of reliable and accurate consolidated 
information, and customisable. The study results revealed that the database currently 
used at Radiation Control is not remotely accessible and while it has most of the data 
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needed by the users, the quality and reliability of such data are in question to the 
respondents (see sections 4.3.1.3 to 4.3.1.7).  
 
The findings also revealed that the database is unable to give users comprehensive 
consolidated information such as the national register of radiation sources. The 
database also does not have the capabilities to be multilingual. The scope of the 
database is not comprehensive enough to cover all the main areas of the regulatory 
framework. The database is not compatible with relevant international standards such 
as the IAEA Safety Standards. These findings indicate a database that is poorly 
resourced with features that makes it unable to give the users what they require.  
 
The study results also highlighted that the database is not integrated within the 
regulatory process of the Radiation Control in South Africa. This however might be as a 
result of the way the database is being utilised. It was also revealed that the database is 
not linked to important relevant information resources such as the ICSRS. The results 
also showed that access control and data consistency check mechanisms of the 
database need to be improved.    
 
The study results also showed that if the Radiation Control database was properly used 
by the adequately trained staff and maintained by enough and qualified personnel, most 
of the problems experienced with it would be eliminated.  
 
The study conclusions are that:  
 
 Based on the findings of this study, the researcher concludes that the Radiation 
Control database is not utilised effectively as a radiation regulatory body database 
system.  
 The Radiation Control database needs to be restructured if its use is to be 
continued.    
 Based on the findings, that the Radiation Control database is poorly managed and 
does not have enough and properly qualified personnel to maintain and use it.  
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 It is also concluded that with better staff training and enough qualified personnel 
dedicated to database matters, the Radiation Control database would be effective 
as a data management tool.    
 Based on the findings of this study, the researcher concludes that RAIS would be 
more suitable than the Radiation Control database in the radiation control 
regulatory framework or programme.  
 
“The IAEA supports states in the implementation of RAIS through regional and 
national workshops, and by providing the necessary equipment and expertise for 
installation and customization of the system” (Regulatory Authority Information ... 
2011).  
 
Based on the findings, the researcher has achieved all the objectives of the study.  
 
 
5.4 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The findings revealed that RAIS might be more suitable and effective as Radiation 
Control‟s database than the currently used one. When the two database systems were 
compared to each other, RAIS compared better than the Radiation Control database. 
Improvements to the database have been recommended by the respondents through 
highlighting its strengths and shortcomings as they completed the questionnaire. These 
include accessibility control and data consistency check mechanisms.   
  
The researcher also developed the database functional requirements and model to 
cross-validate the respondents‟ answers against it. This was done in order to separate 
out issues that could be related to data quality from those that are inherent database 
structural / functional problems.  
 
Regardless of whether Radiation Control decides to improve on the currently used 
database or move to change and replace it with RAIS, the study results have 
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highlighted several shortcomings and strengths of the database. Therefore all the 
objectives of this study have been achieved.   
 
 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Recommendations to improve the functioning and use of the database were suggested 
by the respondents. These include a remotely accessible database which is integrated 
within the regulatory processes of authorisation/licensing, inspection, enforcement and 
follow-up. The study recommends that on-the-field workers such as the inspectors be 
allowed limited access to make changes and updates to the database, specifically on 
the licensee/radiation sources‟ details that they are working with at the time. The 
changes made by the inspectors must be subject to regulation by the database 
administrator/s.  
 
Furthermore the directorate must employ more qualified personnel to deal specifically 
with the database matters. Based on the findings of this study, more people should be 
trained on how to use and manage the database to minimise and eliminate data 
anomalies and redundancies currently seen. This will also help improve the data 
consistency check during and data entry management.  
 
The researcher recommends a switch to the RAIS database system. RAIS is a 
comprehensive system covering by default all the main areas of the regulatory 
framework. RAIS also provides for expanding of its scope to cover other areas of 
interest to the regulatory authority, through its customisation mechanisms. Through 
RAIS, as a database tailor made for the radiation regulatory body, most of the 
challenges currently faced would be resolved.  
 
If the regulatory body was to change to using RAIS, the existing database would remain 
operational until the new one is completely operational, fully functional and the staff well 
trained to use it. As already mentioned above (see section 5.3.2), the IAEA would assist 
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with technical skills and human capital to ensure a smooth change-over to the new 
database. The data that is valid and accurate from the existing database would be used 
in the new one and inspectors would collect correct new missing data to be fed into 
RAIS.          
 
It is further recommended that all Radiation Control staff who uses the database receive 
training on the use of the database.  
 
The summary of the recommendations includes:  
 
 The researcher recommends that Radiation Control should migrate to RAIS as its 
database system. A hybrid approach in which the Radiation Control database is 
modified according to the RAIS database scheme could also be considered as 
another option in this regard. 
 The study recommends that improvements must be made to the Radiation Control 
database‟s resources and scope. The database should be made remotely 
accessible and more qualified personnel should be employed to focus on database 
matters.  
 It further recommends that the database should be integrated within the regulatory 
processes of licensing / authorisation, inspection, enforcement and follow-up.  
 The Directorate Radiation Control should utilise the findings of this study to improve 
the database in areas such as the details of the licensees and radiation sources 
information; data consistency check; and consolidated data like the national 
inventory of radiation sources.   
 It is also recommended that the database should be used as a means for 
information dissemination to the public, and should include information on important 
factors like the categorisation of sources and their associated risk and the essential 
technical services.  
 The researcher also recommends that role-based access be implemented to the 
database in order to restrict access of user groups to specific parts of the database 
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while defining those rights to read, write and/or update rights, according to each 
user‟s specific needs.  
 The researcher also recommends that attention must be paid to data quality and to 
appointment of qualified staff to maintain the database.         
 
 
5.6 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
This study has contributed by highlighting the poor state of the radiation control 
regulatory programme in South Africa. The study has also highlighted the shortcomings 
and strengths of the Radiation Control database. The findings of this study will, 
hopefully,  go a long way in guiding the Department of Health: Directorate Radiation 
Control policy makers in making policies that will help reduce the number of lost, 
missing, or stolen radiation sources in South Africa. This will in turn contribute to the 
improvement of the public health system and radiation safety and protection in the 
country.  
 
1. The study will create awareness to the health and safety policy makers about the 
needs to improve radiation safety and protection thereby improving public health in 
South Africa.  
2. Based on the findings and recommendations of this study, the policy makers can 
make policies that help tighten the laws so that less or no radiation sources go 
missing and endanger the citizens of this country.  
3. The results of this study have shown that there is a great need to improve radiation 
regulatory control in South Africa. This can be done by both employing more 
qualified people and training Radiation Control staff.  
4. Further studies should be carried out to develop a multi-functional database system 
that will best meet the needs of a South African radiation regulatory framework.  
5. Other studies may look into why the Directorate Radiation Control prefers this 
current database; what it would cost to migrate to RAIS; and how effective RAIS 
would be as an information management tool of Radiation Control.  
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5.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
Quantitative research design was used in this study which has its strengths and 
weaknesses. The sample size was small due to a small number of the study population 
(database user employees of Radiation Control). There are a limited number of people 
with experience both of the Radiation Control database and of RAIS for the purposes of 
the comparative study. 
 
There are three radiation regulatory bodies in South Africa (including NECSA and 
NNR). The study was conducted on Radiation Control only employees whose 
background, education level, knowledge of the database, etc may differ from those of 
other regulatory bodies.  
 
There is a primary concern that the researcher is biased against the Radiation Control 
database due to the experience of working with it over the years.  
 
Despite these limitations, the study provides valuable information that could help in 
improving the state of radiation regulatory programme and contribute positively to the 
radiation safety and protection, as well as the public health in South Africa.      
 
 
5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The poorly managed and utilised database, poor access control and data consistency 
check mechanisms, and the shortage of qualified database personnel are contributing 
to the less than effective radiation regulatory programme in South Africa. The Radiation 
Control database appears to be at the centre of the challenges facing Radiation Control 
such as a high number of missing sources and lack of good quality information to trace 
them. See section 4.3.2.1, par. 3 on page 84 above.   
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The regulatory body efforts to exercise effective radiation control will continue to be 
frustrated until the poor state of its data and information management tool and systems 
is addressed and corrected. It is also very important that more people are trained and 
employed to contribute to the improvement of the radiation regulatory programme in 
South Africa.     
      
“A well-designed database facilitates data management and generates accurate and 
valuable information” (Rob & Coronel 2007:9).   
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ANNEXURE B  
 
STUDY SITE APPLICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Enquiries : M Ngubane  
 Reference : 33538115 
 Date : 28 Nov 2011  
 
 
ATT: Mr JHI Olivier 
 
         Director: Radiation Control  
 
 
 
Re: Request for Permission to Conduct a Study 
 
 
I request your permission to conduct a research study titled: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
DATABASE SYSTEMS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIATION SOURCES.  
 
The study is part of my master of public health (MPH) degree studies that I‟m doing at 
Unisa. Radiation Control staff will be requested to participate in the study by answering 
questions administered through a questionnaire.  
 
I hope my request is met with your approval. 
 
 
Thank you 
 
 
 
 
M NGUBANE 
RADIATION CONTROL OFFICER 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Department of Health 
 : 012-3959119 
Fax: 012-3959125 
Cell:  082 3199184 
E-mail: NgubaM@health.gov.za  
Web: http://www.doh/department/radiation/01.html 
Directorate: Radiation Control 
P O Box 977 
PRETORIA 
0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE C  
 
PERMISSION FROM DIRECTORATE: RADIATION 
CONTROL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Verw.     
Ref.       
 
 
AAN/TO  
 
          Mr M Ngubane 
                    
 
 
VAN/FROM   J H I Olivier 
 
DIRECTORATE:  
RADIATION CONTROL 
 
  
Telefoon 021-9486162 
Telephone             
 
 
 U verw. Your ref. 
Navrae JHI OLIVIER 
Enquiries              
 
 
 
Gedateer 
Dated 
 
Datum       2012-02-23 
Date 
 
 
 
 INSAKE 
RE 
 
 
YOUR REQUEST TO CONDUCT A STUDY 
REGARDING THE USE OF THE RADIO-NUCLIDE 
DATABASE 
 
 
 
I refer to your request regarding the above and the 
subsequent communication regarding this matter. 
 
I herewith confirm my previous oral and written approval to 
proceed with your planned study project. 
 
Please ensure that you liaise with Ms Nel in so far it will 
have an effect on staff of the Inspectorate. All interactions 
with head office staff should be through myself. 
. 
I wish you the very best for this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIRECTOR:  RADIATION CONTROL 
     DATE:  2012-02 -23 
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ANNEXURE D  
 
DATA COLLECTION TOOL 1 (CHECKLIST)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criteria Checklist  
 
A – Radiation Control Database    Yes (Y) / No (N) 
B – RAIS        Yes (Y) / No (N) 
                 A                  B  
Criteria Sub-criteria RC 
Database 
RAIS  
1. National 
regulatory 
infrastructure 
information 
o Regulatory infrastructure  
information:  
 Does the database 
have the legislation 
information?  
 Does it have the 
regulations 
information?  
 Does it have the 
codes of practice & 
guidelines?   
 Are the regulatory 
authority‟s 
responsibilities and 
functions available? 
 Are the provisions 
for authority, power 
and resources 
available? 
o Division of responsibilities 
information:  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 Are relevant 
regulatory 
authority‟s liaison & 
working procedures 
available on the 
database?  
 What about 
Memoranda of 
Understanding 
(MoU) with other 
relevant bodies and 
organisations?  
o Is international co-
operation information 
(Bilateral & Multilateral 
agreements) available?  
  
2. Facilities and 
departments 
o Does the database provide 
for full and comprehensive 
licensee (license/authority 
holder) information?  
o Does it provide for different 
applications of radiation 
users information? 
o Does it have the 
Responsible Person‟s / 
Acting/Radiation Protection 
Officer‟s full information 
and details (incl. 
qualifications and 
responsibilities)?  
o Does it make a clear 
difference between the 
user/s and/or legal person 
(licensee) information?  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
3. Radiation sources 
and associated 
equipment 
o Are all sources (x-rays & 
isotopes) information and 
details fully captured by 
the database? 
o Can a National Inventory / 
Register for radiation 
sources be retrieved from 
the database? 
o Does the database have a 
link to the International 
Catalogue of Sealed 
Radioactive Sources 
(ICSRS)?  
  
  
  
4. Authorization o Is the authorization 
process & procedure 
information available?  
o Is the 
Notification/Registration or 
Licensing process (incl. 
and according to safety 
requirements) clearly 
outlined an available?  
o Are the Exemption and 
Exclusion procedures and 
requirements available? 
  
  
  
5. Inspection o Is the role & 
implementation procedure 
made available on the 
database?  
o Are inspectors‟ powers & 
responsibilities clearly 
outlined and available?  
o Are inspectors – legal 
person relations made 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
available?   
o Are all regulatory 
requirements of the 
relevant inspection 
available? 
  
6. Enforcement o Is enforcement action that 
is graded according to 
non-compliance 
information on the 
database? 
o Are safety, instructions, 
sanctions, fines & 
suspensions implication 
outlined?  
  
  
o Is enforcement action 
interaction (regulatory 
authority & other national 
bodies) information 
available?  
  
7. Remote access o Does the database allow 
online submission of 
licence applications or 
update?   
o Can the database be 
accessed by inspectors 
while on the field? 
o Can licensees‟ authorised 
personnel access it?   
o Can the public access it for 
information distribution by 
the authority? 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
8. Customization 
(mechanisms) 
o Is the database 
customisable to regulator‟s 
  
 
 
 
 
specific needs?  
o Is it multilingual?  
o Does it have upward 
compatibility features? 
  
  
9. Radiation 
incidences  
o Is the emergency response 
plan information available 
on the database?  
o Does it provide dose limits 
information (incl. response 
procedure classification 
according to incidence 
type)?  
o Does the database provide 
the dosimetry service 
option / information?    
o Does it communicate and 
co-operate with other 
relevant organizations (e.g. 
IAEA) databases in case of 
incidences?   
  
  
  
  
10. Technical services o Is QA (Quality Assurance) 
information available on 
the database?   
o Does it provide a link with 
other relevant technical 
services organisations / 
information?   
o Does it give Inspection 
bodies 
(accreditation/scope) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
information?  
o Does it provide information 
about leak tests 
procedures and relevant 
organisations?  
o Does it provide equipment, 
sources and instruments 
maintenance (services & 
repairs) information?   
  
  
11. Workers  o Does the database cater 
for workers‟ (authority and 
licensees) qualifications & 
responsibilities 
information?  
o Does it outline their Rights 
& Limitations / information? 
o Does it give details about 
workers‟ verification and 
validation procedure / 
information? 
o Are fundamental 
requirements of workers 
(esp. authority‟s or 
inspectors) available?   
  
  
  
  
12. Data integrity o Does the database do 
proper data validation? 
o  Does it have consistency 
and validation checks?    
  
  
13. Database model  o Is it a relational model?    
14. Security o Does the database have 
security access control?  
o Does it have individual & 
group privileges?    
  
  
 
 
 
 
15. Automated 
Optimization   
o Does the database have 
frequent usage improved 
speed?  
o Does it have performance 
monitoring tools?   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE E  
 
LETTER OF CONSENT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DATABASE SYSTEMS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
RADIATION SOURCES 
 
 
Dear colleague / respondent 
 
 
I am a registered student at Unisa busy with the master of public health degree studies. 
I am conducting a research study titled: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DATABASE SYSTEMS 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIATION SOURCES.  
 
The purpose of my research is to examine and analyse the database systems in order 
to explore the effectiveness of the database system used by Radiation Control. 
 
I would appreciate your participation by answering questions on the questionnaire as 
genuinely as possible.  
 
Please note that your participation in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw from 
the study or interview at anytime you so wish. All data collected in the study will remain 
anonymous and will be kept confidential.  
 
If you have any questions regarding the study please contact me on 031-3072111 or 
0823199184 or 0822130347. If you prefer to e-mail me you may use 
NgubaM@health.gov.za or Mkhuliseni@yahoo.com or Mkhuliswa@gmail.com.   
 
It will take approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour to complete the interview.    
 
Thank you for consenting to participate in the study. 
 
 
Mkhuliseni Ngubane    ……………………………………………………………… 
RCO, Student   Signed By: ………………………………   
     Date: …………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE F 
 
DATA COLLECTION 2 (QUESTIONNAIRE)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE  
 
 
Please answer the questions as honestly as you can. No individual names are required 
since the information you give is strictly confidential. Remember you can decide to 
terminate the session without any penalty.  
 
Respondent no: ..................................... 
Date: ......................................................  
 
1. The Database and Users  
 
1.1 Which of these roles best describes your position within Radiation Control?  
o Administration officer 
o Inspector  
o Scientist  
o Manager  
o Information management officer 
 
1.2 How many times do you use the database in a week? 
o Less than 5 times  
o 5 – 25 times  
o 25 – 50 times  
o More than 50 times  
 
1.3 Is it important that that the database be remotely accessible?  
o Yes 
o No   
o If YES, please explain: ............................................................................ 
 
1.4 Do you miss any data in the database that you would like to see added?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If YES, please explain: ............................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Do you ever encounter inconsistent/ambiguous data while making queries  
 from the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If YES, please explain: ............................................................................ 
 
1.6  Are there any features which you would like to see added to the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If YES, please explain: ............................................................................ 
 
1.7 Do you think it is important for the database to be customisable to the users‟  
 specific needs?   
o Yes  
o No  
 
2. Resources  
 
2.1 What are the available human resources devoted to the database matters?  
o Information Resource Manager / Data Administrator 
o Database Administrator (DBA)   
o Alternate Database Administrator  
o Other (please explain)   
 
2.2 Do you think it is important for the database to be linked to other relevant  
         authorities‟ information resources?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If YES, please explain: ............................................................................ 
 
2.3  Is the database able to give you consolidated data such as the national  
 inventory of radiation sources?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If NO, please explain: ..............................................................................  
 
2.4 Is the organisational structure of the regulatory authority in South Africa  
 clearly outlined in the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If NO, please explain: ..............................................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Does the database have information about memoranda of understanding and  
 bilateral or multilateral agreements with other national and international  
 bodies?  
o Yes  
o No  
o Don‟t know  
 
2.6  Does the database contain enough information about the facilities and  
 departments (licence holders) to facilitate tracking of lost or stolen radiation  
 sources?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
2.7 Does the database have enough details of the radiation sources to facilitate  
 tracking of lost, stolen or missing sources?  
o Yes  
o No   
 
2.8 Are processes of authorisation/licensing, inspection and enforcement clearly  
 outlined and explained in the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If NO, please explain: .............................................................................. 
 
2.9  Are licensees able to submit and monitor their application for authorisation on  
 the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
2.10  Is the process of graded enforcement action for non-compliance explained in  
 the database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o Don‟t know  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Scope  
 
3.1 Do you think that the database is integrated within the regulatory  
 processes such as the licensing, inspection and follow-up?  
o Yes  
o No   
 
3.2  How important do you think it is for the database to provide for the following? 
(5 = Very important; 4 = Important; 3 = Necessary; 2 = Not so important; 1 = Not 
important) 
 
i. Data consistency checking to reduce human errors:   
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
o 1   
 
ii. Protection of vital data against unintentional modification or deletion:  
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
o 1 
 
iii.  Access control to protect data against unauthorised access and to ensure 
confidentiality:  
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
o 1   
 
iv. Means for information dissemination to the public, customised according 
to the regulatory body‟s policy:  
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
 
 
 
 
o 1   
 
v. Interface for catalogues on manufacturers and models of sealed sources, 
radiation generators and associated equipment:  
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
o 1  
 
vi. Online submission of data by the facilities (applicant licensees), subject to 
validation by the regulatory body:  
o 5  
o 4  
o 3  
o 2  
o 1   
 
4. General  
 
4.1  Is there any relevant information in your work that is not being captured for the
 database?  
o Yes  
o No  
o If YES, please explain:  
 
4.2 Do you think the database should allow limited access to inspectors to make  
 certain updates/changes?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
4.3 Do you think the database should allow access to authorised representatives  
 of licensees, such as A/RPO (Acting/Radiation Protection Officer) or   
 Responsible Person, to their particular information?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
4.4 Are you happy with the database being divided into the x-rays and isotopes  
 
 
 
 
 databases?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
4.5  Are there other national or international radiation information resources  
 accessible through the database?  
o Yes  
o No    
o Don‟t know 
 
4.6 Do you have access to other information resources that you may need in your  
 work?  
o Yes  
o No  
 
4.7 Is there enough information on the database about the categorisation of  
 radiation sources and their associated risk?  
o Yes  
o No  
o Don‟t know  
 
4.8 Which of these essential technical services their information is available on  
 the database?  
o Dosimetry services  
o Analytical services  
o Calibration services  
o Radioactive waste management services  
o Training services  
o Accreditation for services  
o None  
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING TIME TO BE PART OF THIS 
STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE G: 1  
 
ENTITY RELATIONSHIP DIAGRAMS (RC DATABASE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS – X-RAYS SCHEMA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENTITY RELATIONSHIPS – ISOTOPES SCHEMA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE G: 2  
 
ENTITY RELATIONSHIP DIAGRAMS (RAIS)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
SOURCES – RADIATION GENERATORS  
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